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A central question in the study of human behavior is whether or not certain categories of 
emotion, such as anger, fear and sadness (termed "discrete emotions"), are universally 
recognized in the nonverbal behaviors of others (termed the "universality of attribution 
hypothesis"). In this dissertation, the universality of attribution hypothesis was revisited 
in order to examine whether individuals from remote cultural contexts perceive the same 
mental states in nonverbal cues as individuals from a Western cultural context. The 
studies described in this dissertation removed certain features of prior universality studies 
that served to obscure the underlying nature of cross-cultural perceptions. In study 1, 
perception of posed emotional vocalizations by individuals from a US cultural context 
were compared to those of individuals from the Himba ethnic group, who reside in 
remote regions of Namibia and have limited contact with individuals outside their 
community. In contrast to recent data claiming to support the universality hypothesis, we 
did not find evidence that emotions were universally perceived when participants were 
asked to freely label the emotion they perceived in vocalizations. In contrast, our findings 
did support the hypothesis that affective dimensions of valence and arousal are perceived 
across cultural contexts. In the second study, emotion perceptions based on facial 
expressions were compared between participants from US and Himba cultural contexts. 
Consistent with the results of Study 1, Himba individuals did not perceive the Western 
discrete emotion categories that their US counterparts did. Our data did support the 
hypothesis that Himba participants were routinely engaging in action perception, rather 
than mental state inference. Across both cultural contexts, when conceptual knowledge 
	  about emotions was made more accessible by presenting emotion words as part of the 
task, perception was impacted. In US participants, perceptions conformed even more 
strongly with the previously assumed "universal" model. Himba participants appeared to 
rely more on mental state categories when exposed to concepts, but a substantial amount 
of cultural variation was still observed. Finally, in Study 3, perceptions of emotion were 
examined in a US cultural context after the focus of participants was manipulated, either 
onto mental states (broadly), emotions or behaviors. Perceptions of emotion did not differ 
substantially across these three conditions, indicating that within a US cultural context 
the tendency to infer mental states from facial expressions is somewhat inflexible. 
Overall, the findings of this dissertation indicate that emotion perception is both 
culturally and linguistically relative and that attempts to apply the Western cultural model 
for emotions as a universal one obscures important cultural variation.	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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
Relativity and universality in the perception of emotion 
An introduction to the emotion universality debate, a review of prior research on 
universality in emotion perception and the critiques of this literature, and a focused 
review on research suggesting that emotion perception is a relative process that is shaped 







“It is the mind which creates the world around us, and even though we stand side by side 
in the same meadow, my eyes will never see what is beheld by yours, my heart will never 
stir to the emotions with which yours is touched.” 
-George Gissing 
 
One of the most compelling story lines in Psychology is that individuals from 
remote corners of the world (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, 
Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1971) can recognize emotion in Western facial muscle 
movements (“facial expressions”). This claim of universality is part of the “basic 
emotion” view, where emotions are assumed to be evolutionarily given and biologically 
basic capacities that all humans share. For example, in this view, the emotion fear 
triggers a set of facial muscle movements, including the widening of the eyes and (often) 
a gaping of the mouth. This external “signal” on the face can then be recognized as “fear” 
by a perceiver. This recognition process should occur regardless of the culture of either 
the individual experiencing fear or the individual perceiving fear. Further, this 
recognition process has been argued to be pre-linguistic (Izard, 1994), such that even 
infants can recognize emotions in others. Based, in part, on the assumptions of 
universality, it was further postulated that innate circuitry in the brain is responsible for 
producing emotions, with each emotion circuit capable of producing a distinct set of 
facial behaviors, in addition to distinct physiological responses, phenomenology and 
other behaviors (Ekman, 1972). This “basic” emotion perspective has thrived in 
psychology and neuroscience and has even gained popularity in the popular media. 
Indeed the implications of a basic emotion perception perspective are profound—we can 
	   
3	  
get a direct read out on the face (and perhaps in the body and brain) of the internal states 
of all other humans. In this sense, the face is a common form of communication that 
should allow us to overcome basic linguistic and cultural boundaries that divide us. 
Further, this opens up new vistas not only for communication, but also for extending the 
psychology of emotion into applied domains such as cross-cultural relations, security, 
law and so on.   
The Universality of Emotion Perception 
The literature on universal perception of emotion gained momentum in the late 
1960s and early 1970s when several researchers, notably Paul Ekman and Carol Izard, 
tested whether individuals from other cultures (outside of the United States) perceived 
emotion from a set of facial poses that were constructed in an a priori fashion (i.e., people 
were directed to pose certain facial actions and the “best” portrayals were selected) to 
“signal” different emotional experiences.  While this literature has grown considerably 
since that time, with hundreds of experiments testing cross-cultural perception of emotion 
(for a meta-analysis see Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), research that tested individuals 
from the most remote cultures is relatively spare.i	  
A handful of experiments did test the universality of emotion perception in the 
strictest sense of the “two-culture” approach (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005), where 
individuals from remote cultural contexts were tested.  The two-culture approach is key 
to arguments of universality, since this approach can rule out shared cultural practice, 
language or direct cultural contact as alternative explanations for similarities in 
psychological phenomena across cultures. In two distinct cultures, people without prior 
exposure to Western media representations of emotion were able to select the correct 
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facial portrayals of anger, fear, sadness, disgust, etc., to match to a corresponding story 
about emotion (Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, Heider, Friesen, & 
Heider, 1972). Further, individuals from the United States were able to select the correct 
emotion term to describe the emotion portrayed in videotapes of individuals from the 
Fore tribe in Papau New Guinea (Ekman, 1972, Study 3).  (Although accuracy rates were 
relatively low —at 36% overall.)  This line of experiments is often described as the 
definitive evidence that the face reveals internal state—or that facial behaviors are linked 
to categories of emotional experience in a one-to-one manner. 
Extending Universality to Vocalizations? 
The neurocultural model put forth by Ekman (1972) included vocal changes as 
part of the signature for each emotional state, but it was only recently that this hypothesis 
was empirically tested using the two-culture approach (Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 
2010). Specifically, it was hypothesized that non-verbal vocal utterances like cries and 
screams are automatically generated by basic emotional states, such that these vocal 
utterances will be recognized in a remote cultural context. This recent experiment 
employed the situation story paradigm (as in the original two-culture work; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971) in order to examine whether there is cross-cultural recognition of emotion 
from brief vocalizations called “vocal bursts”.  Sauter and colleagues tested individuals 
from the Himba, an ethnic group that resides in the North West region (historically called 
the Kaokoland) of the African nation Namibia where they live in small, semi-nomadic, 
pastoral communities that have limited contact with other groups.  The Himba are a 
strong sample for the two-culture approach due to the relative cultural isolation of the 
communities.  Evidence of psychological similarity in perceptions of discrete emotion 
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from the voice between individuals in a Western culture and individuals from the Himba 
cultural context, then, should not be accounted for by cultural similarity or contact.  This 
line of reasoning opens up possibility of an “innate” or universal psychological capacity 
being discovered (although it doesn’t ensure that alternatives are ruled out, a point I will 
return to next).  The results of this work are fairly striking, when taken at face value.  
Himba participants were able to select the vocalization (from a foil) that matched a 
word/story pairing at levels that exceeded chance. These data were used to support the 
conclusion that perception of vocalizations of emotion is a universal capacity.  
Limitations to the Universality Literature 
The universality literature, although wildly popular in the media and its 
applications in other disciplines, also remains contentious within the psychology of 
emotion. Chief among the critiques of this literature is that the methods provided 
conceptual framing that bolstered participants’ performance and may open up these 
experiments to alternative explanations. Specifically, the two main experiments 
conducted by Paul Ekman and colleagues in the Dani and Fore of Papau New Guinea 
involved providing participants with a situational prompt and asking the participant to 
select the face which best matched the prompt.  For example, in response to the prompt 
“he/she is looking at something which smells bad” participants would be presented with 
several options, one of which was a “disgusted” portrayal of emotion.  Since participants 
tended to select the face with a wrinkled-nose, furrowed brow and pulled up lip (i.e., the 
Western pose selected by the researchers as the facial expression for disgust) more often 
than would be expected by chance, these data were interpreted as evidence that the 
emotion of “disgust” was perceived in the facial expression of emotion.  
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The conceptual frame presented in universality experiments attempted to 
accommodate the complexities of testing participants from a preliterate culture and 
difficulties associated with obtaining exact translations of emotion terms (which is itself 
an interesting area of research in the cross-cultural study of emotions). Yet the inclusion 
of a situational story may have also added an interesting source of context that might 
explain the high agreement rates in universality studies (c.f. Russell, 1994). Specifically, 
Russell argues that narrowing the responses of participants down to a few key emotions 
(i.e., the forced-choice paradigm) coupled with the inclusion of conceptual content 
(which in many of the studies in the larger cross-cultural literature were the response 
options themselves) serves to produce uniform responses that participants wouldn’t 
otherwise endorse. This forced choice method appears in so much of the cross-cultural 
work on emotion perception that a meta-analysis of this literature was unable to examine 
method as a factor, for lack of studies that use alternative tasks (Elfenbein & Ambady, 
2002). 
The uniformity of methods employed poses a problem for drawing firm 
conclusions based on the extant cross-cultural literature, particularly given that studies 
directly comparing the forced-choice method to emotion recognition levels based on free 
labeling reveal dramatically different results  (Boucher & Carlson, 1980; Izard, 1971; 
Rosenberg & Ekman, 1995; for a discussion see Russell, 1994; Widen, Christy, Hewett, 
& Russell, 2011). Specifically, providing participants with response options helps to 
increase “accuracy” levels. One older experiment reported a 16% increase in accuracy 
when words were provided in an emotion perception task versus when they were not 
(Kline & Johannsen, 1935), and more recently, this increase in perception accuracy was 
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observed at 26% (Izard, 1971).  Indeed, there are significantly higher cross-cultural 
accuracy findings within certain research groups that employed the forced-choice method 
(see Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), suggesting further that the specific methods employed 
in the cross-cultural literature have a substantial impact on the conclusions that can be 
drawn from that data.  
One explanation is that the forced choice method simply taps recognition memory 
whereas the free labeling method taps recall (c.f. Ekman & Rosenberg, 1995). Indeed, it 
is well established that there are higher accuracy rates in the former type of task. Yet 
perceivers will also agree on the incorrect label when it is provided (Russell, 1993).  And 
there are similar findings in the early literature on emotion perception, where participants 
actually accepted labels that did not “match” the emotion a face was intended to portray 
as correct (Buzby, 1924; Langfied, 1918). Together these data suggest it is unlikely that 
language merely impacts on accuracy because it makes the “correct” response more 
accessible.  Instead, the presence of concepts in the task seem to shift what the perceived 
appropriate emotion category is.   
If language does more than simply make the “correct” category more accessible, 
what could it be doing?  A possible explanation of these effects is that language is 
actually structuring perception (Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007)—that even posed, 
static, highly stereotyped portrayals of emotion (such as the ones used in the universality 
work) are somewhat ambiguous as to their psychological meaning, and emotion words 
(as well as scenarios in the case of the universality literature) appear to help shape those 
percepts into more specific perceptions of “anger” or “fear”.  
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Existing Evidence that Language Structures Perception in a Western Cultural 
Context 
There are a number of findings within a Western cultural context demonstrating 
that language has the capacity to shape emotion perception (reviewed in Barrett et al., 
2007; Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011; Lindquist & Gendron, 2013; Roberson, 
Damjanovic, & Kikutani, 2010). First, emotion words can produce biases in perceptual 
memory for a face, such that participants’ memory for a facial portrayal is shifted toward 
the emotion that was paired (as a word) with the face at encoding (Halberstadt, 2005). 
Recent data suggest that this may be due to the grounding of emotion words in 
sensorimotor representations, given that the tendency to engage facial muscles consistent 
with an emotion word is related to the magnitude of later perceptual bias (Halberstadt, 
Winkielman, Niedenthal, & Dalle, 2009). Further, a completely false perceptual memory 
(i.e., remembering a smile) can be created based on a context that primes a specific 
semantic category (e.g., wining a sporting event), even when there were no category 
relevant facial actions actually present (Fernandez-Dols, Carrera, Barchard, & Gacitua, 
2008). Words also appear to support categorical perception of facial expressions (Fugate, 
Gouzoules, & Barrett, 2010). Perceivers learned chimpanzee expressions (e.g., a hoot) 
either with an arbitrary label or without.  Only those perceivers who learned the 
expressions with labels showed the hallmark of categorical perception—an advantage at 
discriminating morphs that crossed the categorical boundary between two expressions.  
These data suggest that it is not just the structural features of expressions that drive 
categorical perception, but the labels that are linked to those expressions also drive this 
effect. Importantly, these data can explain why many studies conducted in cultures with 
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words for discrete emotions may also demonstrate categorical perception for portrayals of 
those emotions (e.g., Young et al., 1997). 
Words also appear to provide an advantage to young children during emotion 
perception.  Specifically, young children are more accurate to sort matching emotional 
faces into a box, and leave out mismatching faces, when that box is marked by a word as 
compared to when it is marked with a perceptually similar face with an identical posed 
set of facial actions (Russell & Widen, 2002). Further, emotion perception accuracy 
increases in parallel with the development of children’s vocabulary for emotion words 
(Widen & Russell, 2008a).  This happens in a category specific manner that is fairly 
consistent across children.  For example, children acquire the term ‘disgust’ relatively 
late, at a mean age of 56 months (4.6 years) and only around this time do children 
distinguish between negative high arousal fear and disgust portrayals (for a review see 
Widen & Russell, 2008b).  
Likewise emotion perception can be impaired by reducing the accessibility of 
emotion words, even when such words are incidental to the task at hand.  When emotion 
words are made less accessible by a standard laboratory task called semantic satiation 
(for a review see Black, 2003), accuracy on a perceptual matching task drops to 36% 
from 42% (even though emotion words are not necessary to say whether two faces match 
in their emotional content or not) (Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 2006). 
Further, when participants are placed under verbal load, categorical perception for posed, 
caricatured faces is eliminated, such that typical perceptual advantages for distinguishing 
between stimuli from two different emotion categories are wiped out (Roberson, 
Damjanovic, & Pilling, 2007).  Most recently, data suggests that these emotion 
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perception effects resulting from the inaccessibility of emotion concepts may be due to 
shifts in the perceptual representation of faces (Gendron, Lindquist, Barsalou, & Barrett, 
2012).  Specifically, perceptual priming of a given facial expression is disrupted 
following semantic satiation of relevant emotion words (Gendron et al., 2012).  These 
data indicate that words do more than shift judgments or memory for faces, but have an 
impact on the perceptual encoding of faces. 
There are several brain-based studies that provide convergent evidence with the 
perceptual effects at the behavioral level, demonstrating that the distributed neural 
representation of an emotional face is shaped by conceptual processing involving 
emotion language.  Providing perceivers with emotion (but not gender) words 
significantly reduced amygdala response to emotional faces (Lieberman et al., 2007). 
Amygdala response reductions presumably occurred because words helped to resolve 
competing “perceptual hypotheses” that arose from a structural analysis of the face alone 
(faces were presented in the absence of other contextual information).  Furthermore, 
when perceivers judged a structurally neutral face as emotional, this engaged a network 
of regions (e.g., right superior temporal sulcus, bilateral orbitofrontal cortex, right 
anterior insula) (Thieschler & Pessoa, 2007) that are typically thought of as the 
distributed network for emotional face perception (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000) 
and would not be predicted a priori for a structurally neutral face. Neural adaptation to 
emotional faces in this same network also appears to be driven by perceiver 
conceptualization (i.e., judgments of the emotion category), rather than by stimulus-
defined properties (Fox, Moon, Iaria, & Barton, 2009). Specifically, even when repeated 
stimuli in an adaptation paradigm are changed so drastically that they are “perceptually” 
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drawn from a different category, and theoretically should release the brain from 
adaptation (i.e., neural responses should go back up because the stimuli has changed), 
they fail to do so when perceivers judge that the category membership has not changed.  
Taken together data suggest that the neural representation of an emotional face is shaped 
by conceptual processing and is not determined by the stimulus features. Indeed, 
language may be routinely involved in emotion perception. A recent meta-analysis 
comparing brain activity during the perception and experience of emotion observed 
consistently greater activation in language-related regions, including inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG), extending from the pars opercularis (Broca’s area, BA 44) through pars 
triangularis (BA 45) and pars orbitalis on the inferior frontal convexity (BA 47/12 l) 
(Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012).  These data suggest that 
language participates in emotion perception routinely because these activations hold 
across many distinct studies of emotion perception, with distinct task constraints and 
varying dependency on verbal labeling. 
Future Directions of the Universality Literature 
Limitations to the methods used in the universality literature were pointed out 
nearly 20 years ago (Russell, 1994), and mounting evidence (reviewed above) indicates 
that conceptual context importantly impacts emotion perception and, at a minimum, is 
artificially increasing inter-rater agreement in emotion perception studies.  An important 
next step in this literature is to employ the two-culture approach, but to advance beyond 
the methods first introduced in the 1970s. Indeed, implicit in citations of the prior cross-
cultural literature on emotion perception is a naïve assumption that if the features of the 
two-culture approach are met, this provides positive support for whatever “universal” 
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capacity is under exploration.  Of course, data from the two-culture literature (e.g., 
Sauter, et al. 2010) support the conclusion that individuals from remote cultural contexts 
are able to extract some meaning from the Western style vocalizations or faces they 
listened to.  Otherwise, their selections on the task should have been random and not 
exceeded chance levels. But this does not suggest that it is necessarily a basic emotional 
state being perceived. This was the point that Russell (1995) made when he suggested 
that the literature supports minimal universality—clearly some meaning making can 
occur across cultures, just as it can for any type of action another person is engaged in. In 
order to determine what those sources of minimal universality may be, it is instructive to 
dissect the tasks used in the two-culture literature. In the tasks used, there appear to be at 
least three main sources of “information” that participants’ performance may rest on.  I 
will outline these three sources of information below and briefly indicate how the present 
dissertation attempts to examine these sources in more depth.  
Concepts for emotions. The first form of information, concepts, are embedded in 
the majority of tasks in the two-culture literature on emotion perception.  In the task used 
recently by Sauter et al. (2010), words appeared as part of the situation-story cue that 
participants were asked to match to vocalizations. On a given trial, participants were 
presented with a single emotion word (as well as a story) that matched one of the 
vocalizations.  As described in the section on language and emotion perception above, 
narrowing the participant in on a specific concept may have a profound impact on how 
emotion perception proceeds. At a minimum, introducing concepts should lead to higher 
agreement rates than are typically observed when the word is not present.  Perhaps more 
interestingly, concepts may be shaping how the brain uses basic sensory information to 
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arrive at a “percept” for emotion—leading perceivers to perceive distinctions between 
vocal or facial cues as more extreme and categorical (although the language and 
categorical perception work has not directly been extended to the voice). Thus future 
experiments in the two-culture literature would benefit from stripping away this form of 
context in order to compare what accuracy rates and perceptions are like without words to 
bolster performance (for an example in a Western cultural context, see Widen et al., 
2011). This was a primary aim of Study 1 in this dissertation. We examined whether in a 
free-labeling task (without the context of words in the task), individuals from the Himba 
ethnic group perceived the predicted discrete emotions in vocal bursts.  In Study 2, we 
then manipulated the presence or absence of emotion concepts in the task and examined 
the subsequent impact on performance.  
Affective dimensions of valence and arousal. The second potential source of 
information in prior two-culture studies is affective. This source of information is not 
typically directly highlighted in tasks, but instead derives from how the task is structured.  
For example, when response options are limited and the options differ in their basic 
affective properties (as was the case on half of the experimental trials in Sauter et al., 
2010), participants can use affective, rather than discrete emotion information to solve the 
trial sucessfully. For example, if the task is to pick out which of two vocalizations match 
a disgust story, and the two choices are the correct “ewww” vocalization and a foil 
emotion conveying positive affect such as a giggle for amusement, then the perceiver 
could select the “correct” emotion by relying on perception of valence (whether the 
person feels good or bad). While the task feature of limited response options undoubtedly 
served to narrow the complexity of the task, and thus was deemed appropriate for testing 
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individuals from remote cultures with limited exposure to testing contexts, it likely 
shaped the nature of the decision that participants were engaged in. This, in turn, 
complicates attempts to draw conclusions regarding discrete emotion perception from 
those data. While some of the two-culture literature did attempt to include within valence 
(e.g., two negative or two positive) choices, this does not rule out the possibility that 
affect perception was carrying performance on many of the trials—particularly because 
the degree of arousal was rarely controlled for across the two choices. Since the affective 
dimensions of valence (pleasure and displeasure) and arousal (activated to deactivated), 
to a lesser extent, are recovered in nearly all cross-cultural studies aimed at examining the 
structure of affect (Russell, 1991), a second aim of this dissertation was to examine 
whether affective dimensions of valence and arousal are perceived by individuals from a 
remote cultural context.  In Study 1, we examined affect perceptions in vocal portrayals 
of emotion. There is evidence within a Western cultural context that dimensions of 
valence and arousal can be predicted based on the acoustical properties of the voice 
(although arousal to a greater extent) (Bachorowski & Owren, 2003).  These findings 
suggest that that there may be an affective “signal” value in vocalizations that maps on to 
these more simple dimensions and may thus be cross-culturally similar.  
Situation-tuned behavior.  A final feature of all of the two culture experiments 
providing positive support for the universality hypothesis was the presence of situational 
stories as a cue in each of the tasks.  This type of contextual information is important 
because it allows for “accurate” performance to ride on a very different type of inference 
than that of a discrete emotion. Specifically, presenting a situational context allows 
participants to identify situation-tuned actions rather than mental states and still perform 
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“accurately”. Take this example from Ekman and Friesen (1971):  A participant is 
presented with a story “He/She is looking at something which smells bad”, and is asked 
to select which of two faces, an anger portrayal or a disgust portrayal, match the story.  
An important feature of a disgust portrayal is that the nose appears to be crinkling up—
which is argued to function as an oral-nasal rejection of “aversive chemosensory stimuli” 
(Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009). Thus it may be that the simple behavior 
of nose-crinkling, might be sufficient for participants to match the stimulus to the cue, 
without any mental inference about, or knowledge of, disgust. The question of whether 
perceivers from other cultures routinely engage in mental state inference (e.g., inferring a 
disgusted internal state) as opposed to action perception (e.g., someone smelling followed 
by a nose-crinkle) has not been directly examined in the prior literature and was the final 
major aim of the present dissertation. If it is the case that individuals from remote cultural 
contexts are routinely engaging in action perception (rather than mental state inference) 
this would suggest a very different interpretation of the prior universality studies is in 
order. In Study 2 we examined whether there is cultural variation in the extent to which 
individuals engage in mental state inference versus action perception. In Study 3, we then 
attempted to manipulate the tendency to engage in mental state inference within a 
Western cultural context.  This final study was aimed at assessing the relative stability 
versus malleability of mental state inference depending on the manner in which 
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i Unfortunately, misconceptions are present in the published record regarding 
which experiments tested the most remote cultural samples. For example, Norenzayan 
and Heine (2005) cite Ekman and colleagues’ 1969 paper as an example of “comparing 
expressions across cultures with minimal cultural history and contact with each other” (p. 
767).  (Technically, a remote cultural sample that fits this description was not reported on 











Cultural relativity in perceiving emotion from 
vocalizations 
A test of the universality of attribution hypothesis for vocal cues. This study replicated 
and extended recent work in order to examine whether vocalizations are cross-culturally 
perceived from the voice in a task that does not provide conceptual context. Further, we 
examined whether perception of affective dimensions are perceived from the voice across 
cultural contexts.  
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A central question in the study of human behavior is whether or not certain categories of 
emotion, such as anger, fear and sadness (termed “discrete emotions”), are universally 
recognized in human vocalizations (termed the “universality hypothesis”).  A recent 
paper published in PNAS [Sauter DA, Eisner F, Ekman P, & Scott SK,  (2010) Cross-
cultural recognition of basic emotions through nonverbal emotional vocalizations. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
107(6):2408-2412.] reported that members of the Himba ethnic group in Namibia 
recognized discrete emotions in non-verbal human utterances such as sighs, laughs, and 
screams, providing apparent support for the universality hypothesis.  Yet, prior research 
has shown that emotion concept words embedded in the experimental task inflate the 
evidence for universality, and that removing the influence of those words can disrupt the 
perception of discrete emotions in US perceivers.  In the present experiment, we 
predicted, and found, that when emotion concept words are not introduced as part of the 
experimental task, Himba participants failed to perceive discrete emotions in Western 
vocalizations intended to portray emotion.  Importantly, Himba participants were able to 
perceive more basic properties of valence (positivity or negativity) and arousal (high or 
low activation). US participants did perceive discrete emotions in the vocalizations, but 
had lower agreement with the expected emotion than reported in prior studies that 
introduce concept words. Our findings indicate that the voice can reliably convey 





Think about the last time you heard someone sigh, chuckle, or groan. Perhaps you 
concluded that the person was tired, amused, or frustrated (respectively). Perceiving 
mental states from vocal cues is automatic and effortless, leading to the assumption that 
as perceivers, we “recognize” emotions in non-verbal cues and that emotion recognition 
is a universal human capacity (1). This is called the universality hypothesis. Originally 
developed to understand how people read facial expressions, the universality hypothesis 
assumes that (barring illness), all humans around the globe innately express the same 
internal mental states (i.e., emotions) on the face (as the universal, non-verbal behaviors); 
for example, scowling in anger is supposed to be innate.  Furthermore, people from very 
different cultures should be able to recognize emotions in the same non-verbal 
expressions; for example, in all cultures, perceivers should be able to gaze upon a 
scowling person from any culture in the world and instantly recognize that he or she is 
angry. In strong versions of the universality hypothesis, emotion “recognition” is 
presumed to proceed directly from perceiving the perceptual regularities in non-verbal 
behaviors (e.g., people scowl in anger and only anger) and is not dependent on language 
and associated conceptual knowledge (2).  Furthermore, emotion expression and 
perception are presumed to have co-evolved (3, 4) so that they are inborn and neither 
depends on learning across development (5). The universality hypothesis is so popular 
that it has become part of the story of what it means to be human in Western culture:  It is 
standard curriculum in psychology textbooks, has been the subject of magazine articles in 
the New Yorker and National Geographic, has been a topic for science shows like 
“Radiolab”, and is even the subject of a syndicated television show (“Lie to Me”). 
Government spending on security training (6, 7) is based, in part, on the assumption that 
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it is possible to read a person’s intent from non-verbal behaviors, regardless of cultural 
background or life experiences. 
Of the hundreds of published cross-cultural experiments on emotion perception 
(8), only six provide a strong test of the universality hypothesis (see Table S1) because 
they used a method called the two-culture approach (9): they examined whether 
participants from maximally distinct cultural backgrounds, with limited exposure to 
Western culture, could decipher emotions in Western-style expressions. A recent paper in 
PNAS (10) is a good example of the two culture approach, testing whether Himba 
individuals residing in remote villages in the Kunene region of northwest Namibia (and 
largely isolated from Western cultural influences) perceived Western non-verbal vocal 
utterances (laughs, screams, sighs, etc.) in line with their intended “universal” emotional 
meaning (which looks identical to the Western model); for example, were perceivers able 
to recognize laughs as “amusement”, screams as “fear”, sighs as “relief” and so on?  On 
each trial, participants were asked to select which of two vocalizations (e.g., a sigh and a 
scream) corresponded to a story about an emotional situation described with an emotion 
word (e.g., “Someone is suddenly faced with a dangerous animal and feels very scared”). 
More frequently than chance, Himba participants chose the vocalization that best fit the 
Western model (e.g., the scream), leading Sauter et al. to claim support for the 
universality hypothesis.  To our knowledge, this was the first and only study to examine 
the universality hypothesis with vocal cues using participants from a remote culture. 
Although the universality hypothesis has largely been accepted as fact in both 
popular and many scientific circles, evidence against the idea of universal emotion 
perception steadily accumulates.  First, there is growing evidence for substantial cross-
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cultural variation in emotion perception (for a review see 11).  In a recent paper published 
in PNAS, for example, researchers used random generation of facial expressions to show 
that people from different cultures have dramatically different mental representations of 
emotions on the face (12), presumably because they have been exposed to different 
expressions in daily life. Second, and perhaps most important for our purposes here, is 
the observation that two-culture studies supporting the universality hypothesis (listed in 
Table S1) have a common element that appears to inflate the degree of agreement in 
emotion perception across cultures: they explicitly include emotion words in the 
experimental task.  Participants in these studies were asked to select an expression to 
match a single emotion word, typically embedded in a longer description (e.g., 10). Of 
the six studies that provide the best empirical test of the universality hypothesis, the four 
experiments including emotion words within the method provided support for the 
universality hypothesis (i.e., people from culturally isolated groups and Western 
participants both perceived emotion in non-verbal stimuli according to the Western 
pattern). The two experiments that did not constrain responses with a small set of 
emotion words but asked participants to freely label the non-verbal expressions (i.e., to 
think of and nominate their own words as labels) did not find support for universality 
(i.e., people from culturally isolated groups and Western participants did not perceive the 
same emotions in the non-verbal stimuli). More generally, free-labeling experiments do 
not find strong agreement on the putative “universal” response even in Western 
participants viewing posed Western-style expressions (13-15). By presenting an non-
verbal expression to a participant and asking him or her to choose an appropriate label 
from a small set of alternatives (or presenting several non-verbal expressions and asking 
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the participant to pick the one that best matches an emotion adjective), experiments 
dramatically increase what has been called “recognition accuracy” (i.e., their ability to 
choose an answer that matches the Western pattern that the experimenters expect) over 
what would be observed when the expressions are presented alone and participants are 
asked to report on their own spontaneous perception. 
The power of words in producing “emotion recognition accuracy” (11, 16) is 
clearly demonstrated in a number of lines of recent research.  For example, an 
experimental procedure called “semantic satiation” (e.g., 17) can be used to reduce the 
accessibility of emotion word knowledge, which in turn dramatically reduces a person’s 
ability to perceive emotion in facial expressions (18), because words help to shape the 
underlying perceptual representation of those faces in the first place (19-21). Individuals 
who have a permanent loss of word and object knowledge resulting from 
neurodegeneration of the left anterior temporal lobe (i.e., people with semantic dementia) 
do not perceive scowls as anger, pouts as sadness, smiles as happiness, and so on, 
although these patients can distinguish which facial expressions are positive, negative, 
and neutral (i.e., they can make simple “affective” distinctions) (22). These findings are 
consistent with recent meta-analytic findings that the anterior temporal lobes and left 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (regions involved in language processes such as semantic 
representation and retrieval) show a consistent increase of activity during neuroimaging 
studies of emotion perception (23).  Furthermore a patient suffering from language 
impairments (i.e., semantic aphasia) demonstrated difficulty grouping together posed 
facial expressions into the discrete emotion categories that those faces are designed to 
portray (24). Even the developmental psychology literature points to the importance of 
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emotion words in emotion perception young in children. While young infants can 
perceive the positive/negative or arousing properties in non-verbal behavior (25) (i.e., 
affect perception is present), carefully controlled experiments reveal that what looks like 
an infant’s ability to recognize emotion in non-verbal displays (i.e., discriminating a 
toothy smile depicting happiness from a closed mouth scowl depicting anger) actually 
turns out to be more simplisitic featural processing (infants were distinguishing “toothy” 
vs “nontoothy” faces) (26).  Furthermore, young children who do not yet have a fully 
differentiated emotion lexicon group facial expressions together based on valence 
(whether the face is depicting a pleasant or an unpleasant facial expression) but the ability 
to distinguish scowls, frowns, nose-wrinkles and so on only emerges as children acquire 
linguistic categories for discrete emotions (27).  
Taken together, perceivers in emotion recognition experiments, whether 
conducted only in the US or cross-culturally, do not appear to be merely “recognizing” 
emotion in the perceptual features of a non-verbal expression alone.  Instead, they match 
faces or vocalizations to a smaller, constrained set of word alternatives.  These 
alternatives represent experimenters’ expectations that all participants will be recognizing 
emotion according to a Western model.  As a result, in the two-culture studies, the 
presence of emotion words in the experimental method appears to be a critical element 
producing higher agreement on the “correct” responses, thereby increasing the 
appearance of universality (c.f., 28).  
 A simple but strong test of the universality hypothesis with vocal cues, then, 
would require participants from a cultural context that is relatively isolated from Western 
cultural influences (such as Himba individuals who live in remote villages in 
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northwestern Namibia) to freely label Western vocalizations, rather than choose a 
response from a small, highly selected group of emotion words.  If both Himba and US 
participants spontaneously label the vocalizations as discrete emotions in agreement with 
the experimenter’s expectations, then this would provide support for the universality 
hypothesis. Alternatively, cultural specificity would be supported if Himba participants 
fail to label the vocalizations with the predicted emotion words when US participants 
labeled the vocalizations with the expected discrete emotion words.  Given the research 
showing that presumed universal pattern often fails to materialize even in US participants 
in free-labeling studies (13, 15, 29, 30), a third possibility is that neither the Himba nor 
the US participants would produce the expected discrete emotion words, or that the US 
participants would do so at a level of agreement that was below what was reported in 
Sauter et al (10).  Finally, there is ample evidence that facial and vocal cues are perceived 
in terms of the pleasantness or unpleasantness (valence) and the level of activation or 
quiescence (arousal) that they communicate (31, 32). There is evidence that these 
“affective” properties are universally perceived (33).  Support for the universality of 
affect perception would occur if Himba participants spontaneously labeled the 
vocalizations in agreement with the valence or arousal of the portrayed emotion, 
including responses that “confuse” discrete emotion categories (e.g., a scowl would be 
correctly labeled for valence as “anger”, “fear”, or “disgust”). 
Participants in our experiment were sampled from the Himba ethnic group, as in 
Sauter et al. (10).  The Himba people live in remote villages spread throughout the 
Kunene region of Northwest Namibia (historically known as the Kaokoland). The Otji-
Herero language spoken by the Himba contains a set of emotion words that have been 
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translated into English words for emotion in prior research (see 10), suggesting that it 
should be possible to find evidence of universal emotion perception in vocalizations if 
such universality exists.  Our comparison group was sampled from the Boston Museum 
of Science (MoS, located in Massachusetts, USA).  All participants from the Boston MoS 
were English-language speakers and were tested within the museum environment which 
well approximates the social and distracting nature of testing in the field in Namibia.  
Participants completed a free-labeling task where on each trial, a participant 
listened to one of 18 non-word vocalizations and nominated a word to label the emotion 
being portrayed that vocalization. The stimuli (taken from 34) portrayed the same 
emotions as in Sauter et al, but were posed by American (as opposed to British), 
individuals making them a within culture stimuli for our sample of participants. The 
vocalizations posed Western portrayals of nine different discrete emotions (two 
utterances for amusement, anger, disgust, fear, relief, sadness, sensory pleasure, surprise, 
and triumph were presented to each participant; see Table 1). Each participant wore 
headphones so that the researcher (and the translator, who was present for the Himba 
participants) were blind to the particular stimulus that the participant was exposed to on 
any given trial.  The participant’s response was recorded verbatim on each trial (in the 
case of the Himba participants, their exact response was translated into English and 
recorded). Each participant was tested individually and no feedback was offered or 
provided. A response was coded as having “discrete agreement” if the participant offered 
a specific emotion word that was expected (e.g., “angry” or “anger” for a growl) or a 
close synonym  (e.g., “mad”).  
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We also computed an index of valence-based agreement (e.g., the word “sad” was 
used to label a growl because both sadness and anger are unpleasant or negative states) 
and an index of arousal-based agreement (e.g., the word “angry” was used for a 
“woohoo” where the correct response would be “triumph” because both anger and pride 
are states of high activation).  
Data for the discrete emotion, valence and arousal codes just described were 
analyzed by comparing the mean percent agreement against zero (following omnibus 
ANOVA tests).  This was a liberal test of the universality hypothesis, because any 
agreement statistically above zero would be considered intact perception within a cultural 
context, despite the possibility that “correct” agreement could be driven by only a few 
participants’ correct response.  
Results 
Emotions are Not Universally Perceived in Human Vocalizations 
Our results do not support the hypothesis that emotions are universally 
“recognized” in vocal utterances, and instead support the hypothesis that emotion is 
perceived in vocalizations in a culturally relative manner (Table S2). An ANOVA on 
mean percentage of agreement, with cultural group as the between subjects factor (Himba 
vs. US) and the emotion category as the within subjects factor (amusement, anger, 
disgust, fear, relief, sadness, sensory pleasure, surprise, triumph), revealed that, in 
contrast to US participants, the Himba participants rarely produced the expected emotion 
label for the vocal utterances, F(1, 46)= 146.351, p<.001, ηp2=.761. This main effect 
difference was qualified by a significant emotion x cultural group interaction F(8, 368)= 
12.113, p<.001, ηp2=.208 (See Figure 1).  Both US and Himba participants had the 
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highest agreement for labeling laughter as amusement, 79% and 69% respectively.  Both 
groups were also more likely to labeled screams as fear with a frequency that was 
significantly greater than zero, at 54% and 20%, respectively.  For all other categories of 
emotion, the Himba participants provided word labels that agreed with the universal 
solution less than 5% of the time (which did not differ significantly from zero), 
suggesting that most of the vocalizations were not perceived similarly across cultures. 
Further, Himba participants did not label “eww” vocalizations, growls or crying as 
disgust, anger and sadness, respectively, countering claims that these emotions are 
universally perceived in vocalizations. One reason why Himba participants had lower 
agreement rates may reflect a cultural tendency to describe vocalizations in 
behavioral/situational rather than mental terms (see SOM). It is important to note that 
these results reflect a liberal test of “cross-cultural” perception, since very low means 
could reflect the intact performance of only a few individuals.  When we submit these 
data to more stringent “chance” criteria accounting for the number of stimuli in the 
experiment and the valence/arousal conveyed by a given stimulus, the results are even 
less consistent with the universality hypothesis (see SOM).  
While US participants tended to produce labels that agreed with the putative 
universal solution, they did at much lower levels of agreement that reported in 
experiments that ask participants to match a vocalization to an emotion word from a 
small set of words provided by the experimenter (10, 34, 35). For example, in Sauter et 
al, British participants “recognized” between 75% and 100% of the vocalizations they 
were presented with, dwarfing performance in our experiment. Importantly, US 
perceivers ”recognition” in our experiment is relatively modest when considered from the 
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standpoint of ecological validity – on average, almost 40% of the time, perceivers are 
mislabeling exaggerated vocalizations that are supposed to be diagnostic of disgust or 
sadness, almost 35% of the time mislabeling growls that are supposed to be diagnostic of 
anger, and so on.  Furthermore, without providing a concept for participants, US 
perceivers did not correctly label sounds depicting triumph (achievement)--with 
agreement levels that were completely at floor, suggesting that this vocalization does not 
have a culturally conveyed, let alone universal, meaning.  
Affect is Perceived Universally in Human Vocalizations 
Valence.  Our results support at least minimal universality of valence perception 
(distinguishing pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant states) in vocal utterances.  An ANOVA 
on mean percentage of valence-based agreement, with cultural group as the between 
subjects factor and emotion category as the within subjects factor, revealed that both US 
and Himba participants were able to freely label the utterances correctly for valence at 
greater levels than would be expected by chance (with the exception of portrayals of 
surprise by Himba participants), at 75% vs. 50.46%, respectively.  In contrast to US 
participants, however, the Himba participants offered fewer valence-consistent labels for 
the vocal utterances, F(1, 46)=40.20, p<.001, ηp2=.466. The effect of cultural group was 
qualified by an interaction between emotion category x cultural group, F(8, 368)=13.273, 
p<.001, ηp2=.224 (See Figure 2; Table S3).  When compared to US participants, Himba 
participants were less likely to freely label vocalizations of disgust, fear, and, sadness 
with negative emotion or affect terms, and they were less likely to freely label 
vocalizations of sensory pleasure with positive emotion or affect terms. Again, this may 
reflect the tendency of Himba participants to provide content that was not related to 
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mental states (see SOM).  US and Himba participants were equivalently likely to perceive 
positivity in vocalizations for triumph and negativity in vocalizations for anger. 
Interestingly, Himba participants were more likely than US participants to level 
vocalizations of amusement as positive (p<.001, 2-tailed). 
Arousal.  Our results also provide some limited support for minimal universality 
of arousal perception (distinguishing activated, neutral, and deactivated states) in vocal 
utterances. The perception of arousal from vocalizations is less robust cross-culturally 
than valence, particularly because Himba participants appeared to have difficultly 
correctly labeling lower arousal states of relief, sadness, and sensory pleasure (see Figure 
3; Table S4). An ANOVA on mean percentage of agreement, with cultural group as the 
between subjects factor and the portrayed emotion category as the within subjects factor, 
revealed that, in contrast to US participants, the Himba participants produced less 
arousal-consistent labels for vocal utterances than did US participants, F(1, 46)=60.259, 
p<.001, ηp2=.567.  Whereas US participants perceived arousal with comparable accuracy 
to valence at 72.69% (SD=32.46), Himba participants’ agreement level was considerably 
lower, at 37.03% (SD=32.95).  The effect of cultural group was qualified by an 
interaction between emotion x cultural group, F(8, 368)=6.15, p<.001, ηp2=.118, 
indicating that Himba participants did not as frequently freely label the vocalizations with 
words that were in agreement with the level of arousal portrayed in the utterance (all 
p’s<.005, 2-tailed), with the exception of utterances for amusement and surprise .  Again, 
this limited evidence for universality may be because Himba perceivers often employed 






Which mental states are universally perceived from vocalizations? 
When emotion words are embedded in emotion perception tasks, researchers find 
evidence for universal emotion “recognition” (36-38).  When the experimenter does not 
provide emotion words to constrain perceiver options, evidence for universality is 
considerably weaker, if it is observed at all (39), even in US participants (13-15).  In our 
experiment, where participants listened to human vocalizations that were explicitly 
designed by experimenters to universally depict emotions (34), and freely labeled those 
vocalizations, evidence for universal emotion perception was not found. Himba 
participants did not label the vocalizations with discrete emotion words that would be 
expected according to the hypothesized universal (but largely Western) pattern, even 
though such words are available in the Herero language spoken by Himba participants.  
Even US participants, who produced the expected labels did so at a considerably lower 
level of agreement than was observed for exactly the same stimuli in another US sample 
(34). Our findings are consistent with prior research showing that spontaneously 
produced labels produce much lower agreement than responses selected from a pre-
determined list (c.f., 28). Taken together, our findings are consistent with a growing 
number of studies showing that emotion perception is culturally relative (for a review see 
11), and that evidence for universal emotion “recognition” is highly dependent on the 
experimental context (28). 
Our findings suggest that affect perception shows some evidence of universality.  
Himba individuals (who are relatively isolated from Western influence) were able to 
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perceive vocalizations from US individuals as valenced (pleasant, neutral or unpleasant), 
and to some extent as high or low arousal (activated, neutral, or deactivated). The affect 
perception findings are somewhat inconsistent with evidence that acoustical markers (i.e., 
fundamental frequency and amplitude) correlate more with the arousal than with the 
valence of an utterance (40).  One reason for this discrepancy may be that the posed, 
categorical stimuli used in our experiment fail to capture the full range of vocal qualities 
in naturalistic vocalizations. Furthermore, the stimulus set is optimized to distinguish 
perceptions of emotion and therefore might lead participants to emphasize valence over 
arousal perception when selecting a verbal label response.  A direct arousal perception 
task might reveal that arousal is indeed universally perceived from the voice more 
readily.   
The idea that affect perception is closer to a core human capacity (41) might 
provide an alternative explanation for the Sauter et al findings that have previously been 
interpreted as evidence for the universality hypothesis. Recall that in their experiment, 
Himba and US participants were presented with an emotion word (e.g., disgust) 
embedded in a story and then heard two vocalizations, and their task was to choose the 
vocalization that best matched the story.  On half of the experimental trials, participants 
were asked to choose between two utterances that differenced in valence.  For example, 
in response to the story “Someone has just eaten rotten food and feels very disgusted”, 
participants would have heard a positive utterance such as a portrayal of amusement 
(laughter) and a negative utterance such as a portrayal of disgust (“ewww”); participants 
could have picked the correct utterance by perceiving affective valence alone, having 
nothing to do with emotion perception per se. On other trials, the distractor vocalization 
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shared the same valence as the correct choice but may have differed in arousal level.  In 
response to the same story, for example, participants might have heard a low arousal 
utterance such as someone portraying sadness (crying) vs. a high arousal utterance such 
as someone portraying disgust (“ewww”); participants could have distinguished the two 
vocalizations on their arousal level alone. Thus, the “above chance” performance of 
Himba participants in the Sauter et al. study might have reflected valence perception on 
half the trials and arousal perception on some additional proportion of trials (left 
unspecified in their method description), rather than the universality of emotion 
perception per se. 
Why Only Minimal Universality of Affect?  Perceiving Actions Instead of Mental 
States in Vocalizations 
Himba participants’ failure to perceive the intended discrete mental states 
suggests that linkages between specific vocalizations (e.g., crying) and specific mental 
states (e.g., sadness) are not cross-culturally preserved. Yet Himba participants produced 
a fair amount of content to describe the vocalizations that did not reference mental states.  
That is, Himba participants often described the vocalizations they heard in terms of 
situations (e.g., someone is sick) and actions (e.g., screaming), rather than as evidence of 
mental states per se (disgust and anger, respectively) (see SI for additional analyses of 
this content). Himba participants were able to provide behavioral and situational 
responses that were tailored to the stimuli on 12% of the trials.  This is perhaps not 
surprising given that the stimuli used in this experiment (e.g., a disgust vocal pose) were 
originally elicited by asking the posers to imagine a particular situation (e.g., “You come 
in contact with something physically noxious or contaminating”), and to produce the 
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vocalization that would occur in that context. It may be that there is some minimal 
universality to the tuning of these discrete vocalizations to different situations, regardless 
of culture.  This raises the question of whether the Himba participants were, in some 
capacity, having a “percept” of emotion. On the one hand, social psychological research 
on action identification has demonstrated that describing an action at a physical level is 
distinct from the mental level, such that the former does not require a representation of 
the other person’s internal state (42). Furthermore, emotion perception, as defined in a 
Western cultural context, is also meant to involve a representation of another individual’s 
mental state. Thus the action identification literature suggests that the Himba participants 
did not perceive emotion on trials where they produced behavioral descriptors. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the Himba conception of emotion does not involve 
mental states to the same degree; although this is speculative, there is documented cross-
cultural variability in the concept of emotion itself (43), with some mental taxonomies 
lacking a word for emotion entirely, such as in early Buddhist writings (44) or in the 
German language (43), where no generic term for emotion exists.  The prevalence of 
behavioral labels of vocalizations in this experiment may reveal a cultural difference in 
the tendency to infer mental states as causes for actions, more generally, although future 
research would be required to explore this possibility.  
Limitations 
One potential limitation of the present experiment was the use of translated, 
verbal responses as our primary dependent variable of interest.  This concern is mitigated 
by the fact that our translator also worked on the Sauter et al study (45), which reduces 
the possibility that differences in results between the two studies are attributable to 
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simple differences in translation. Another potential limitation is that we did not use 
Himba vocalizations as stimuli with both Himba and US perceivers. Although the one-
directional test of Western vocalizations (that had been previously normed and published 
for the purposes of studying the universality hypothesis) (34) should be sufficient to 
examine whether the Western cultural model is in fact the universal one. To properly 
explore the observed cultural relativity in emotion perception, however, future research 
should involve collection of vocalization stimulus sets from other cultures as well as in 
Sauter (10). Finally, like the majority of experiments that are published on emotion 
perception, we used posed, portrayed vocalizations of emotion (i.e., the "portrayal 
paradigm"; 46), rather than spontaneously elicited vocalizations. Prior research has 
shown that evidence of universality is typically enhanced with the use of posed stimulus 
sets which tend to be less variable and more caricatured than spontaneous stimuli (c.f. 47, 
see also 48). The fact that we did not find evidence of universality cannot be explained by 
stimuli lacking in sufficient statistical regularity or “source clarity”, a critique leveled 
against much of the literature on relativity in perception.  Nonetheless, future research on 
cultural relativity in emotion perception might be best served by using spontaneous, 
naturally occurring vocalizations, in order to gain more ecological validity . 
One unexpected finding is that participants were better able to perceive affect in 
certain vocalizations (e.g., a triumphant “woohoo”) when compared to others (e.g., a sigh 
of relief). This may be the product of variability in the underlying mechanisms that are 
involved in generating these sounds to begin with. At least two mechanisms for 
producing vocalizations have been identified. In what Owren calls the “production-first” 
system (49) and Scherer calls “push” effects (50), vocalizations are produced reflexively 
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by the physiological changes accompanying affective arousal. In what Owren calls the 
“receptive first” system, and Scherer’s “pull” effects, vocalizations can also be “ritualized 
or conventionalized” acoustical patterns that require experience and can be volitionally 
produced even in the absence of affective changes in experience (e.g., the exclamation 
“yuck!”), even if it often accompanies affective states.  It may be that vocalizations where 
affect is not perceived cross-culturally are the sole products of this second (non-affective) 
mechanism, and entirely dependent on experience and culture. If this is the case, what 
looks like evidence for “minimal universality” of affect perception in our findings may 
actually reflect universality of affect perception, but relativity of some culturally specific, 
non-affective vocalizations. Future research should examine these questions more 
directly. 
The Universality of Emotion 
Universal emotion recognition has been taken as evidence for the universality of 
emotion generation  – if everyone around the world can recognize emotion expressions, 
then these expressions must be universally produced (i.e., there must be perceptual 
regularity in production across cultures; c.f. 28).  Many psychologists and researchers in 
related disciplines have hypothesized that emotions like sadness, anger, disgust and fear 
have universal, biological cores (51) that are present from infancy (5), can be detected in 
the brain (52), peripheral nervous system (53), face (45), and voice (54), and can be 
readily decoded by perceivers (4). Yet recent reviews of the empirical evidence call into 
question claims about the biological basicness of each emotion category based on the 
brain (55), the peripheral nervous system (56), and the face (57). Such findings are 
consistent with emerging research, including the data presented here, that emotion 
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perceptions appear not to be universal. Instead, the present findings are more consistent 
with an alternative view of emotions as conceptualized affective states (58, 59) that are 
highly culturally variable (60) and that are the product of more basic “core” human 
capacities.   
Conclusion 
In this study we show that discrete emotions are not universally perceived in 
vocalizations.  Without the context of a word/story and a limited range of responses 
options, Himba participants did not perceive the same emotions from vocal burst 
portrayals as English speaking participants. In fact, removing the words reduced 
agreement in US participants compared to what has been demonstrated in other studies, 
suggesting that the prior literature also overestimates the robustness of within culture 
emotion perception from the voice. We also show that both Himba and US participants 
were able to perceive whether the target individual is experiencing positive or negative 
affect, and high or low arousal levels (although to a lesser extent), suggesting that these 
affective dimensions may be better candidates than emotion for a “core” human capacity.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Himba.  Participants were 24 native Herero speakers from the Himba ethnic 
group (12 male, 12 female; mean age= 35.96, SD=14.5)§. Data were collected in three 
remote villages, all located in the Mountainous Northwest region of Namibia.  None of 
these villages had an established school or other signs of outside presence. Most members 
of the Himba communities remained within their villages and had limited contact with 
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outsiders (although one of the men in one village owned a truck that he used for trips to a 
nearby town for supplies). All testing locations were far from the regional towns, and 
there was no evidence of tourism to these villages as is typical for those closer to towns.  
None of the participants spoke fluent English (although one participant was able to 
exchange simple greetings in English).   
American. Participants were 24 individuals tested at the Boston Museum of 
Science in Boston, MA, United States (13 male, 11 female; mean age= 38.41, 
SD=18.71); participants included 22 Caucasian individuals, 1 Asian individual and 1 
African American individual. All participants reported being native English speakers. 
Data were collected in the busy museum environment that was similar in activity level to 
the field testing environment in Namibia. 17 participants had at least a bachelor’s degree 
and the sample had a median yearly household income range of $87,500-99,000.  
Stimuli 
 The stimuli were 36 non-word vocalizations (two male and two female native 
English speakers, each producing a vocalization to depict amusement, anger, disgust, 
fear, sensual pleasure, relief, sadness, surprise and triumph).  These vocalizations were 
previously validated as prototypical tokens of emotion within a Western cultural context 
(34) and are similar to those used in Sauter et al (2010), except that we used vocalizations 
for triumph rather than Sauter et al.’s use of achievement vocalizations (on the 
assumption that pride is a better candidate for universality; ). We created two stimulus 
sets of 18 stimuli each.  Each participant in our study was presented with one set 
(including one male and one female exemplar for each emotion category). The stimuli 
were cleaned for ambient noise on the audio track and the mean peak amplitude was 
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adjusted to be equivalent in all stimuli using Audacity audio editing software 
(http://audacity.sourceforge.net/).  
Procedure 
This research was approved by the Northeastern University Institutional Review 
Board’s Office of Research Protections.  All participants were consented prior to the start 
of the experiment. Himba participants were verbally consented through a translator.¶ US 
participants were consented with a standard form matched for informational content with 
the verbal consent. Participants were outfitted with headphones and verbally instructed 
(via the use of a translator for Himba participants) in the following manner: “You are 
going to hear some people make sounds with their voices. The people you will hear are 
feeling different emotions.  We want to you try and figure out what emotion they feel 
based on how their voice sounds.  Please do your best to come up with a single label to 
describe the feeling the person is having.  If you cannot come up with a single word, you 
can give us a few words to describe the feeling.  Before you hear each sound, you will 
hear a [beep]. That sound tells you that the voice is coming and to pay close attention.  
Once you hear the voice, go ahead and tell us what emotion you think the person is 
feeling.”  
 On a given trial, a “ready?” prompt came on screen.  If the participant appeared 
ready (i.e., not visibly distracted by the surroundings), the trial proceeded.  On some 
occasions, we paused for several seconds to accommodate participants so that they would 
be able to fully attend to the stimulus presentation.  In those cases, the participant was 
verbally asked if he/she was ready before proceeding.  Once the experimenter pressed the 
spacebar, the trial started.  After 250 ms a tone was played to cue the participant to the 
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onset of the stimulus, followed 250 ms later by a vocalization stimulus.  Following the 
stimulus, participants typically verbally responded to the stimulus without any prompting.  
If the participant did not start to provide a verbal response after a second or two, we 
prompted the participant “What emotion did you hear?”  The translator provided an 
immediate translation|| of the verbal response of the participant and this translated content 
(or original response for American participants) was entered into the laptop computer by 
the experimenter. If the participant provided a description of a situation, behavior or 
bodily state, they were prompted: “Can you think of a single word to describe the feeling, 
the emotion?” If the participant provided a vague affective response (e.g., “good” or 
“bad” feeling), they were prompted: “Can you think of a more specific feeling word to 
describe the emotion?”  Responses were entered in the order they were provided such 
that any contextual content (i.e., situational, behavioral, or physical state) provided was 
always recorded in addition to any mental state terms generated.  
Data Coding 
Prior to any coding, all task and individual level trial information was removed 
and the trials were fully randomized such that the data were not nested by culture or 
individual.  That is, coders were blind to culture as well as the individual a given 
response was from.  Removing participant level information ensured that no clues to a 
given participant’s cultural context that could be extracted from a given response would 
affect the coding of the remainder of that participant’s data. The data were coded in two 
different sets modeled after Russell (1990) and overviewed below. 
The data were independently coded by two trained individuals. Researchers 
subjectively coded responses on a given trial relative to the emotion portrayed by the 
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stimulus vocalization (no other trial level information was available to the coders). Three 
sub-codes were created: discrete emotion, valence and arousal. Participants rated whether 
content agreed or disagreed with the stimulus. In addition to coding for agreement, both 
coders indicated instances when “no content” was available.  This allowed for us to 
establish whether there was reliability regarding when mental content on each of the three 
dimensions was specified. Final percentage agreement was computed across all trials of a 
given emotion (i.e., regardless of when mental content was specified or not). Reliability 
between the two researchers (Cohen’s Kappa) was high for each of the sub-codes: 
discrete emotion = .957, valence = .943, arousal = .958. Discrepancies in coding were 
resolved by review and discussion among the coders and the first author. Support for 
universality of discrete emotion perception would be evidenced by high (and significantly 
above 0) accuracy for the discrete emotion code, regardless of cultural context.  Support 
for relativity of discrete emotion perception, on the other hand, would be evidenced by 
high agreement for American participants, but low (and not significantly different than 0) 
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§ While there is a numerical system in Herero, most individuals in the communities we 
visited did not keep track of their age according to this system.  Instead, most of our 
participants either provided estimates of their age or we estimated age for the participants 
based on their reproductive history, number and age of children if applicable as well as 
general physical appearance.  As a result, the age distribution we report for our Himba 
participants is not exact. 
¶ We used the same translator as the original Sauter et al. [Sauter DA, Eisner F, Ekman P, 
& Scott SK (2010) Cross-cultural recognition of basic emotions through nonverbal 
emotional vocalizations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 107(6):2408-2412.] work, making our testing context and translations 
maximally comparable. 
|| One notable limitation to our translations is for longer responses that lacked a feeling 
label. Because of the novelty of the translation process, some participants would provide 
extremely long verbal responses that were not easily translated in real time.  If the 
participant gave a long response, in some cases the translator provided only partial 
content for that response (i.e., leaving out speech repetitions). In those instances, the 
translator focused his efforts on recording any emotion terms that the participant 
provided.  The experimenter (MG) was familiar with the most frequent discrete emotion 
labels in Otji-Herero and can attest that the translator provided adequate and consistent 
translations for those terms. A notable limitation, however, is that the data do not capture 
the narrative nature of some of the longer responses provided by participants. In addition 
to an immediate translation, the translator recorded the specific Otji-Herero word/words 
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Figure 1. Cross-cultural comparisons for emotion. Himba and American participants’ 
performance for perception of discrete content from the voice. Mean percentage (± SEM) 
of discrete emotion response agreement based on coding (by two independent raters) of 
the mental state content of responses only is presented on the y-axis.  Data are presented 
by culture and discrete emotion portrayal type (x-axis). 
 
Figure 2. Cross-cultural comparisons for valence. Himba and American participants’ 
performance for perception of valence (positive, negative and neutral) content from the 
voice.  Mean percentage (± SEM) of valence response agreement based on coding (by 
two independent raters) of the mental state content of responses only is presented on the 
y-axis.  Data are presented by culture and discrete emotion portrayal type (x-axis). 
 
Figure 3. Cross-cultural comparisons for arousal. Himba and American participants’ 
performance for perception of arousal/activation (high, mid, and low) content from the 
voice. Mean percentage (± SEM) of arousal response agreement based on subjective 
coding (of two independent raters) of the mental state content of responses only is 






Table 1. Descriptions of Vocalizations by Emotion Portrayed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Discrete Emotion Portrayed Vocalization  
amusement giggle/laughter 























Chance Level Response Analysis 
 We examined whether participants produced the “universally” correct labels more 
frequently than would be expected by chance (following Ekman and Rosenberg’s 
analyses (6)) by comparing observed percentage agreements against a threshold of 1/9, 
given that there were nine different emotion categories portrayed by the vocalizations in 
our experiment.  The results are presented in Table S5.  For US participants, the overall 
pattern of results did not change from the more liberal test against 0.  For Himba 
participants, perceptions of screams as portrayals of fear did not exceed chance levels in 
this analysis, in contrast to the significant effect in the more liberal test reported in the 
main text.  This result cautions against the strong interpretation that fear is  “universally” 
perceived from the voice at a group level, since only a few individuals from Himba 
culture labeled screams as fear. Further, Himba participants were significantly less 
accurate than chance, for a number of emotion portrayal types (i.e., anger, sadness and 
relief). Disgust, surprise and triumph portrayals elicited no correct responses from Himba 
participants (i.e., accuracy was at floor with a mean and standard deviation of 0) and thus 
did not undergo statistical testing.  
In addition, we used a second set of more stringent thresholds for emotions that 
are similar in affective valence and arousal, allowing us to determine whether participants 
offered labels with any degree of specificity over and above what would be expected by 
their basic affective properties (again following Ekman and Rosenberg’s analysis 
approach (6)).  For example, vocalizations portraying anger, fear, and disgust are all 
unpleasant and highly aroused. If participants perceived those utterances in terms of 
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affective properties of valence and arousal, then they would be equally to offer labels 
such as “anger” “fear” and “disgust” for screams.  As such, to determine if participants’ 
labels communicated any information about discrete emotion over and above valence and 
arousal alone, we compared free-labeling responses for these three categories of 
vocalizations to what would be expected on the basis of affective perception, which was 
1/3. Similarly, vocalizations portraying sensory pleasure and amusement are pleasant and 
moderate in their arousal. If participants perceived utterances in terms of affective 
perception, then they might be equally likely to offer labels such as “pleasure’ and 
“amusement” for laughs. As a consequence, to determine if participants were labeling 
discrete emotions (as compared to valence and arousal level), we compared free labeling 
responses for these categories to a criterion of ½.  As can be seen in Table S6, 
participants did not perceive vocalizations as indicative of the same mental states across 
cultures, contrary to the universality hypothesis. The only emotion perceived by Himba 
participants significantly above chance was amusement from laughter vocalizations. This 
more stringent test also revealed less evidence in support of “universal” perception, such 
that agreement on sensory pleasure was not significantly above chance levels. 
Action Identification vs Mental State Inference 
One observation that was made when coding for Himba participants responses is 
that there were many instances where perceivers described the target person’s 
vocalizations physical (e.g., screaming) rather than mental (e.g., fearful) terms. The 
distinction between these two types of descriptions was the basis of Action Identification 
Theory (24), which posited that there is variation in how much mental state inference a 
person engaged in during action perception. For example, eating might be described as 
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chewing and swallowing, or as getting nutrition, the latter implying an intention behind 
behavior. Perceiving emotion in a vocalization is an act of mental state inference, because 
an internal state is assumed to be responsible for the observable “expression”; this stands 
in contrast to perceiving the actions in more physical (and less psychological) terms. We 
tested whether adopting an action identification perspective might reveal more 
consistency in the responses of Himba participants. Two coders independently assessed 
for whether Himba and US participants labeled the vocalizations with action words (i.e., 
behaviors) and situational descriptions vs. mental state words (i.e., emotions).  Reliability 
of codes (Cohen’s Kappa) was high for both at .928 and .895, respectively.  Overall, US 
participants generated more mental state content (83.102%) compared to Himba 
participants (71.296%), F(1, 46)=7.116, p<.05, ηp2=.134, but this was qualified by an 
interaction between emotion portrayal type and culture, F(8, 368)=5.375, p<.001, 
ηp2=.105 (Table S7). In contrast to the overall pattern of effects, Himba perceivers 
generated more mental state content than US perceivers in response to laughter 
vocalizations (poses of amusement). Further, several vocalization types (i.e., sensory 
pleasure, surprise and triumph) did not yield different amounts of mental state content 
across cultures.  Interestingly, it was primarily the so-called “basic” emotion 
vocalizations that yielded more mental state content from US compared to Himba 
perceivers.  This finding is consistent with the special status that emotions like anger, fear 
and sadness have in US culture.  
In contrast to mental state content, action and situational content was generated 
more by Himba perceivers (68.750%) than by US perceivers (11.574%), F(1, 
46)=130.665, p<.001, ηp2=.740, but this was qualified by an interaction between emotion 
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portrayal type and culture, F(8, 368)=2.447, p<.05, ηp2=.051 (Table S8).  Follow-up 
analyses within each culture revealed that Himba perceivers produce the same amount of 
action/situational content, regardless of the emotion portrayal type, F(8, 184)=1.475, 
p=.169, whereas US perceivers generate different amounts of action/situation content, 
depending on the emotion portrayal type, F(8, 184)=4.113, p<.001, ηp2=.152.  Bonferroni 
corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that US perceivers generate significantly less 
action/situational content in response to fear vocalizations compared to sensory pleasure 
vocalizations, p<.05, 2-tailed (other emotion portrayal means fell between these two 
extremes and did not differ significantly from one another). 
  Despite differences in the amount of content that US and Himba cultures produce, 
it is important to test whether the content produced was appropriately tailored to the 
stimulus. Action/situational content was then coded based on how well it agreed with the 
discrete emotion category portrayed in the vocalization.  For example, if the vocalization 
“ewww” for disgust, was described as “someone is sick” this was coded as in agreement 
with the discrete emotion content.  Simple action words such as “crying” could also be in 
agreement with the discrete emotion portrayed if they fit the US cultural assumptions 
about the relationship between behavior and emotion (e.g., crying is in agreement with 
sadness).  Reliability of codes (Cohen’s Kappa) for the two coders was high at .95. 
Discrepancies in coding were resolved by review and discussion among the coders and 
the first author in a way that was blind to culture. The results are presented in Table S9.  
Himba participants were more likely to choose action/situation labels that better 
described the perceptual information in the vocalizations than did American participants 
for vocalizations depicting amusement, anger, fear, sadness and sensory pleasure, F(8, 
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368)= 9.657, p<.001, ηp2=.174. These data demonstrate that, for some of the 
vocalizations, Himba participants were able to perceive the vocalization and/or the 
situational context in which it might occur, even if they did not make mental state 
inferences about the vocalization as might be expected in a Western cultural context. 
While Himba participants do not perceive the intended emotion in the Western portrayals 
they were exposed to, some of the sounds were recognizable in terms of specific contexts 
in which they might occur, or based on a specific term for that type of vocalizations (e.g., 





Figure S1. Cross-cultural comparisons for mean agreement between action and 
situation labels and the expected discrete emotion category. Himba and American 
participants’ performance for contextual (situations or behaviors) response 
appropriateness given the discrete emotion posed by a given vocalization. Mean 
percentage (± SEM) of discrete emotion response agreement based on coding (by two 
independent raters) of the contextual content of responses only is presented on the y-axis.  
Data are presented by culture and discrete emotion portrayal type (x-axis). 
 
Figure S2. Cross-cultural comparisons for mean agreement between action and 
situation labels and the valence portrayed. Himba and American participants’ 
performance for contextual (situations or behaviors) response appropriateness given the 
valence (positive, negative and neutral) content posed by a given vocalization.  Mean 
percentage (± SEM) of valence response agreement based on coding (by two independent 
raters) of the contextual content of responses only is presented on the y-axis.  Data are 
presented by culture and discrete emotion portrayal type (x-axis). 
 
Figure S3. Cross-cultural comparisons for mean agreement between action and 
situation labels and the arousal-level portrayed. Himba and American participants’ 
performance for contextual (situations or behaviors) response appropriateness given the 
arousal/activation (high, mid, and low) content posed by a given vocalization. Mean 
percentage (± SEM) of arousal response agreement based on subjective coding (of two 
independent raters) of the contextual content of responses only is presented on the y-axis.  
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Supplementary Tables and Figures 
 
Table S1. Universality studies in remote cultural contexts 
  Cultural Groups 
 














Studies in Support 
of Universality 
        




New Guinea Fore 
(319) 
Y Y Select Face 2-3 71.8 %  
 
 
 Ekman et al. (1972), 
unpublished; 






New Guinea Dani 
(64) 
Y Y Select Face 2-3 65.7 %  
 
 
 Sauter et al., (2010) English  Himba  
(58) 
Y N Select 
Vocalization 
2 64.5 %  
 
Studies in Support 
of Relativity 
        
 Sorensen (1975) U.S. 
 
New Guinea Fore  
(n not reported) 
N n/a Free label n/a 25.78 %* 
 
 




N n/a Free label n/a “anger” 
response for all 
stimuli 
Note. Adapted from Elfenbein & Ambady (2002). N = no; Y = yes; n/a = not applicable. “Conceptual Content” column indicates 
whether conceptual content for emotions (typically in the form of situation vignettes) was explicitly included within experimental 
trials. *Computed based on reported data (mean accuracy not weighted by sample sizes per condition because not reported). 	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Table S2. Agreement between Freely-Produced and Expected Discrete Emotion Labels 
 Cultural Group 
 US  Himba 
Emotion Portrayed Mean SD  Mean SD 
Amusement 68.750*** 35.547  79.167*** 32.693 
Anger 64.583*** 42.934  2.083 10.206 
Disgust 58.333*** 38.069  .000 .000 
Fear 54.167*** 46.431  20.833** 35.864 
Relief 66.667*** 31.851  2.083 10.206 
Sadness 58.333*** 35.098  2.083 10.206 
Sensory Pleasure 43.750*** 39.871  4.167 20.412 
Surprise 70.833*** 32.693  .000 .000 
Triumph 6.250 22.421  .000 .000 
Note:  Mean agreement (and standard deviation) between participants’ free-labeling 
responses and the labels that were expected for each category of vocalizations (i.e., the 
Western emotion category that the vocalizations were intended to portray).  Data are 
presented by cultural group and discrete emotion category. One-sample t-tests were 
conducted to examine whether perceivers agreement level was significantly greater than 
zero.  ***p<.001, **p<.01    
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Table S3. Agreement between Valence Portrayed and Freely-Produced Labels  
 Cultural Group 
 US  Himba 
Emotion Portrayed Mean SD  Mean SD 
Amusement 70.833*** 29.180  97.917*** 10.206 
Anger 82.292*** 23.865  75.000*** 36.116 
Disgust 89.583*** 20.743  60.417*** 36.053 
Fear 83.333*** 24.077  54.167*** 35.864 
Relief 67.708*** 31.691  20.833*** 25.181 
Sadness 83.333*** 31.851  58.333*** 31.851 
Sensory Pleasure 48.958*** 39.342  20.833** 29.180 
Surprise 76.042*** 29.005  0.000 0.000 
Triumph 72.917*** 25.449  66.667*** 31.851 
Note:  Mean agreement (and standard deviation) between participants’ free-labeling 
responses and the labels that would be valence-congruent with each category of 
vocalization.  Data are presented by cultural group and emotion category. One-sample t-
tests were conducted to examine whether perceivers’ agreement level was significantly 




Table S4. Agreement between Arousal Level Portrayed and Freely-Produced Labels 
 Cultural Group 
 US  Himba 
Emotion Portrayed Mean SD  Mean SD 
Amusement 70.833*** 29.180  77.083*** 32.900 
Anger 73.958*** 32.537  41.667*** 38.069 
Disgust 77.083*** 32.900  31.250** 41.211 
Fear 79.167*** 35.864  37.500*** 39.700 
Relief 83.333*** 31.851  10.417 25.449 
Sadness 62.500*** 33.783  14.583** 23.215 
Sensory Pleasure 47.917*** 40.323  14.583* 27.502 
Surprise 79.167*** 29.180  64.583*** 40.323 
Triumph 80.208*** 26.559  41.667*** 28.233 
Note:  Mean agreement (and standard deviation) between participants’ free-labeling 
responses and the labels that would be arousal-congruent with each category of 
vocalization.  Data are presented by cultural group and emotion category. One-sample t-
tests were conducted to examine whether perceivers’ agreement level was significantly 
greater than zero.  ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05	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Table S5. Overall Chance-Level One-Sample T-tests	  
  Cultural Group 
  US  Himba 
Emotion Portrayed Criterion Mean SD  Mean SD 
Anger 11.111 64.58*** 42.93  2.08***† 10.21 
Fear 11.111 54.17*** 46.43  20.83 35.86 
Disgust 11.111 58.33*** 38.07  0 0 
Sadness 11.111 58.33*** 35.10  2.08***† 10.21 
Amusement 11.111 68.75*** 35.55  79.17*** 32.69 
Sensory Pleasure 11.111 43.75** 39.87  4.17 20.41 
Relief 11.111 66.67*** 31.85  2.08***† 10.21 
Surprise 11.111 70.83*** 32.69  0 0 
Triumph 11.111 6.25 22.42  0 0 Note:	  Mean agreement (and standard deviation) between participants’ responses and the 
portrayed discrete emotion category.  Data are presented by emotion portrayal type (i.e., 
the Western emotion category that the vocalization was intended to portray) and cultural 
group. One-sample t-tests were conducted to test whether participant performance was 
above chance-level according to an overall criterion set based on the number of stimuli 
types included in the experiment.  ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, † t-statistic is negative 
indicating mean is significantly less than criterion. 
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Table S6. Within Valence and Arousal Chance-Level One-Sample T-tests 
  Cultural Group 
  US  Himba 
Emotion Portrayed Criterion Mean SD  Mean SD 
Anger 33.33 64.58** 42.93  2.08***† 10.21 
Fear 33.33 54.17** 46.43  20.83 35.86 
Disgust 33.33 58.33* 38.07  0 0 
Amusement 50 68.75* 35.55  79.17*** 32.69 
Sensory Pleasure 50 43.75 39.87  4.17***† 20.41 	  
Note: Mean agreement (and standard deviation) between participants’ responses and the 
portrayed discrete emotion category.  Data are presented by emotion portrayal type (i.e., 
the Western emotion category that the vocalization was intended to portray) and cultural 
group. One-sample t-tests were conducted to test whether participant performance was 
above chance-level according to a criterion set based on the normative valence and 
arousal level associated with a given emotion in Western culture.  ***p<.001, **p<.01, 
*p<.05, † t-statistic is negative indicating mean is significantly less than criterion. 
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Table S7. Mean Percent Production of Mental State Labels 
 Cultural Group   
 US (N=24)  Himba (N=24)   
Emotion Portrayed Mean SD  Mean SD t df 
Amusement 77.083 29.4115  97.917 10.2062 3.278** 28.460† 
Anger 91.667 19.0347  64.583 42.9336 -2.825** 31.705† 
Disgust 87.500 22.1163  72.917 25.4489 -2.119* 45.123† 
Fear 93.750 16.8916  62.500 36.8605 -3.776*** 32.252† 
Relief 89.583 25.4489  66.667 35.0982 -2.590* 41.947† 
Sadness 83.333 28.2330  52.083 42.9336 -2.979** 39.758† 
Sensory Pleasure 60.417 36.0530  68.750 32.3449 .843 45.469† 
Surprise 85.417 27.5016  79.167 32.6931 -.717 44.690† 
Triumph 79.167 25.1805  77.083 32.9003 -.246 43.062† 
Note:  Mean percentage (and standard deviation) of responses containing mental state content based on the portrayed discrete emotion 
type (i.e., the Western emotion category that the vocalization was intended to portray) and culture.  Independent-sample t-tests were 
conducted to examine whether perceivers from US and Himba culture differed in the amount of mental state labels they produced. 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05; †Equal variances not assumed.  
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Table S8. Mean Percent Production of Action and Situational Descriptions 
 Cultural Group   
 US (N=24)  Himba (N=24)   
Emotion Portrayed Mean SD  Mean SD t df 
Amusement 18.750 35.5470  66.667 43.4057 4.184*** 46 
Anger 4.167 14.1165  68.750 24.7268 11.112*** 36.553† 
Disgust 8.333 19.0347  68.750 32.3449 7.886*** 37.225† 
Fear 2.083 10.2062  70.833 35.8641 9.033*** 26.701† 
Relief 8.333 24.0772  66.667 31.8511 7.157*** 42.815† 
Sadness 8.333 19.0347  85.417 23.2153 12.579*** 44.299† 
Sensory Pleasure 29.167 32.6931  70.833 35.8641 4.206*** 46 
Surprise 10.417 25.4489  56.250 42.5096 4.532*** 37.610† 
Triumph 14.583 23.2153  64.583 40.3225 5.265*** 36.738† 
Note:  Mean percentage (and standard deviation) of responses containing action and situational content based on the portrayed discrete 
emotion type (i.e., the Western emotion category that the vocalization was intended to portray) and culture.  Independent-sample t-
tests were conducted to examine whether perceivers from US and Himba culture differed in the amount of action/situational they 















Table S9. Mean Agreement for Action and Situation Labels and the Expected Discrete Emotion Category 
 Cultural Group 
 US  Himba 
Emotion Portrayed Mean SD  Mean SD 
Amusement 25.000** 39.010  62.500*** 44.843 
Anger 2.083 10.206  12.500* 22.116 
Disgust 4.167 14.117  6.250 16.892 
Fear 2.083 10.206  29.167*** 32.693 
Relief 4.167 20.412  12.500* 26.581 
Sadness 4.167 14.117  58.333*** 43.406 
Sensory Pleasure 18.75** 32.345  4.167 14.117 
Surprise 2.083 10.206  2.083 10.206 
Triumph 8.333* 19.035  10.417 25.449 
Note:  Mean agreement (and standard deviation) between participant’s contextual response content and the portrayed discrete emotion 
category.  Data are presented by cultural group and emotion portrayal type (i.e., the Western emotion category that the vocalization 
was intended to portray). One-sample t-tests were conducted to examine whether perceivers performed at significantly greater than 




























Cultural and Linguistic Relativity in Perceiving Facial 
Expressions for Emotion  
A test of the universality of attribution hypothesis for facial cues. This study replicated and 
extended the universality work on facial expressions in order to examine whether facial muscle 
poses are cross-culturally perceived as discrete emotion mental states. Further, we manipulated 
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It is widely believed that certain emotions are universally recognized in facial expressions. 
Recent evidence indicates that Western perceptions (e.g., scowls as anger) depend on emotion 
concepts embedded in experiments. Since concepts are standard in cross-cultural experiments, 
we hypothesized that evidence of universality depends on this context. Participants from the US 
and the Himba ethnic group sorted images of facial expressions into piles by emotion. Himba 
participants did not show the “universal” pattern. To manipulate concepts, half of the participants 
were instructed with emotion words. Concepts impacted sorting in both cultures; participants 
produced sorts closer to the “universal” pattern, but substantial cultural variation was evident for 
Himba participants. Our findings indicate that perceptions of emotion are not universal, but 
depend on cultural and conceptual contexts. 
 
One Sentence Summary: Emotional expressions are not universally recognized, but perceiving 







Since the 1970s, it has been widely accepted that all humans around the world (barring 
illness) reliably express particular emotional states (such as anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and 
happiness) with characteristic facial movements, called “facial expressions” (Fig. 1).  It is further 
assumed that people all around the world automatically recognize emotions in these expressions 
(e.g., scowls are recognized as anger, pouts as sadness, and so on) in a way that is language and 
concept free (1-3). We refer to this as the universality hypothesis. The idea that emotions have 
universally recognized facial expressions has been absorbed into Western popular culture and 
undergraduate science curriculums. Each year the government spends on security training based, 
in part, on the assumption that it is possible to read a person’s intent and predict his or her 
behavior from facial expressions, regardless of cultural background or life experiences (4, 5).   
A strong test of the universality hypothesis is achieved by comparing emotion 
perceptions in individuals with limited exposure to Western style “expressions” to perceptions in 
individuals from Western cultural contexts (such as the US) (6). Of the hundreds of experiments 
cited in support of the universality hypothesis (7), only five provide a strong test because they 
sampled participants from groups culturally isolated from Western influence (1, 8-11) (see Table 
1). Of those five, three found support for the universality hypothesis.  In these three experiments, 
participants performed a task of matching posed expressions (usually static, unmoving faces) to 
conceptual content for emotions. For example, participants might be presented with an orally 
translated story, such as “He is looking at something which smells bad” (describing a disgust 
scenario) and asked to select the matching expression from two or three options (8). In the two 
experiments that did not ask participants to match a facial expression to preselected conceptual 
content, the universality hypothesis was not supported (12) (see Table 1). Evidence for the 
universality hypothesis does not come from people merely “recognizing” emotion in the 
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perceptual features of facial expressions alone; instead, participants typically match faces to 
provided emotion concepts (either primed directly with a word or indirectly with a story) that 
represent a Western model for perceiving emotion.  
One of the most efficient ways of making emotion concepts available to perceivers is to 
embed emotion words themselves into the task. In fact, there is emerging evidence from 
laboratory experiments, lesion studies, and brain imaging research that the presumed “universal” 
(i.e., Western) pattern of emotion perception necessarily depends on being able to process the 
emotion words that are routinely explicitly offered as part of the experimental design (13, 14). 
Experiments that do not offer US participants a small, preselected set of emotion words to match 
posed Western-style facial expressions do not find evidence that people are perceiving emotion 
according to the presumed universal pattern (15).  Taken together, there is an emerging picture 
that challenges one of the most cherished facts in the science of psychology: the “universal” 
pattern of emotion perception is achieved not on the basis of the perceptual features of faces 
alone, but on how those features are understood in the conceptual context of the experimental 
task.  
New evidence of cultural relativity rather than universality in emotion perception 
To re-examine the universality hypothesis, we tested emotion perception in non-Western 
participants using an experimental procedure that is relatively freer from the conceptual content 
typically embedded in the task. We tested members of the Himba ethnic group who live in the 
remote villages within the Keunene region of Northwestern Namibia and have relatively little 
contact with people outside of their immediate communities (and therefore limited exposure to 
emotional expressions outside their own cultural context), making them good candidates for 
testing the universality hypothesis. The Himba speak a dialect of Otji-Herero that includes 
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translations for the English words “anger”, “sadness”, “fear”, disgust”, “happy” and “neutral” 
(10). We presented 26 Himba adults (16) and 31 US adults with photos of six target individuals 
posing facial expressions of the type that are typical of emotion perception experiments (each 
smiling, scowling, pouting, nose wrinkling, wide eyed to depict happiness, anger, sadness, 
disgust, and fear, respectively), as well as each in a neutral expression (see Fig. 1). Participants 
sorted the 36 faces into piles, where targets in each pile were experiencing the same emotional 
state.  Following their free sorting, participants labeled their piles.  Labels were directly 
translated into English by an interpreter who worked on a prior study with Himba participants 
supporting the universality hypothesis (Table 1, Row 4; 10). If scowling faces are universally 
perceived as angry, pouting faces as sad, smiling faces as happy, and so on, then participants in 
both cultures would freely sort the 36 stimulus faces into six piles (based on the perceptual 
regularities in the stimulus set, with all the scowling faces in one pile, all the pouting faces in 
another, and so on), and would label those piles using the expected emotion words.   
A hierarchical cluster analysis of the free sort data, and subsequent examination of the 
six-cluster solution (corresponding to the presumptive “universal” solution), indicated that the 
Himba and US participants did not perceive the facial expressions similarly (Fig. 2, A, B; 
dendrograms in Fig. S1). As expected, the US participants grouped together smiling (happy), 
scowling (angry), wide-eyed (fearful) and neutral faces into distinct piles, although there was 
less clear discrimination of the pouting (sad) and nose-wrinkled (disgusted) faces. Himba 
participants, in contrast, (Fig. 2, B) grouped smiling (happy) faces together, wide-eyed (fearful) 
faces together, and neutral faces together, with no clear grouping of the scowling (angry), 
pouting (sad), and nose-wrinkled (disgusted) faces. The words that participants freely offered to 
name their piles confirmed our observation that Himba participants did not perceive the facial 
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expressions according to the “universal” pattern (Fig. 3). As expected, US participants tended to 
use discrete emotion words such as “sadness” or “disgust” to label their piles (M = 4.45, SD = 
1.091) more than did Himba participants (M = .81, SD = .939), t (55) = 2.644, P < .001. 
Interestingly, US participants more generally named their piles with a wide array of additional 
mental state words such as “surprise” or “concern” (M = 2.32, SD = 1.447) at greater frequency 
than did Himba participants (M = .69, SD = .838), t (55) = 1.630, P < .001. In contrast, Himba 
participants were more likely to label face piles with descriptions of physical actions such as 
“laughing” or “looking at something” (M = 2.38, SD = 1.098) when compared to US participants 
(M = .84, SD = 1.098), t (55) = -1.546, P < .001, suggesting that individuals in Himba culture 
used behavioral descriptors more frequently than mental state descriptors to understand the 
meaning of facial actions. Indeed, extensive research on Action Identification Theory (17) 
indicates that it is possible to describe another person’s actions in either physical or mental terms 
(18). For example, perceiving a face as “fearful” requires mental state inference because an 
internal state is assumed to be responsible for the observable “expression”; this stands in contrast 
to perceiving actions on the face in more physical (and less psychological) terms (e.g., looking) 
that might be observed in any number of emotional or non-emotional instances (e.g., see Table 
S1).  
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) analyses of the free sort data (Fig. 4) confirmed that 
Himba participants possessed a cognitive map of the facial expressions that was anchored in 
action identification, whereas the US participants’ cognitive map also contained information 
about mental state inferences of discrete emotions. MDS analyses produce a cognitive map of the 
sorting pattern for each group of participants, along with the underlying dimensions that best 
represent how participants perceived the similarities and differences among the face stimuli (see 
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SOM for more detail; 19). Rather than subjectively interpreting the dimension weights (as most 
experiments do), we opted for an empirical approach using hierarchical regression analysis (as in 
20). Following Action Identification Theory, we first examined the extent to which the MDS 
dimensions reflected “behavioral” information in the faces (see Table S2), followed by the extent 
to which the dimensions reflected “mental state” inferences supported by the faces (see Table 
S3) over and above behavior (see SI for details). We predicted, and found, that the MDS 
dimensions for the Himba solution would reflect behavioral distinctions, whereas the dimensions 
for the US solution would reflect mental state distinctions (over and above behavior; see Table 2, 
Tables S4 & S5 for F-tests).  
Taken together, comparing Himba and US free sort data indicated strong cultural 
differences in emotion perception.  It is unlikely that these findings were simply due to “poor” 
task-related performance in Himba participants, who have performed well on other psychological 
testing with significant demands (21). Furthermore, the R2 values for identification of the MDS 
dimensions were large for Himba participants’ data, indicating that there was robust and 
meaningful group-level consistency in how Himba participants sorted the face stimuli.  
Emotion words impact emotion perception in a culturally relative manner 
 To explicitly examine the effect of emotion words on emotion perception, 28 additional 
Himba participants (i.e., separate participants drawn from same two villages where we ran the 
free sort task) and 36 additional US participants sorted the 36 stimulus faces into piles but were 
provided with verbal anchors of the six relevant emotion words (“anger”, “fear”, “disgust”, 
“sadness”, “happy”, and “neutral”, or their translation in the Himba dialect of Herero as 
“okupindika”, “okutira”, “okujaukwa”, “oruhoze”, “ohange” and “nguri nawa”, respectively). 
We hypothesized that if these emotion words encourage a certain pattern of emotion perception, 
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as suggested by recent research (15, 22, 23), then both Himba and US participants would differ 
in their sorting compared to the free sort samples where the emotion words were not introduced.  
Specifically, we expected that US anchored sort responses would better resemble the expected 
“universal” solution when compared to US free sort responses. Furthermore, if emotion concept 
words are linked to universal perceptual representations (e.g., furrowed brow and pressed lips in 
anger) across distinct cultural contexts, then Himba participants would also produce a more 
“universal” (i.e., Western) looking solution in the anchored sort procedure. If the perceptual 
representations linked to emotion concept words vary across distinct cultural contexts (as recent 
evidence suggests, 24), however, then Himba participants’ sorting of facial expressions might 
differ with the introduction of emotion words, but would not be clearly in line with the presumed 
universal (i.e., Western) cultural model.  
As predicted, the introduction of emotion word anchors prior to and during sorting 
influenced both US and Himba participants’ perceptions of the facial expressions. Participants 
from the US (and to a limited extent, Himba participants) conformed more to the “universal” 
emotion perception solution. The hierarchical cluster analysis produced a much clearer 
“universal” pattern for the US participants in the conceptually anchored condition, with nose-
wrinkled (disgust) and pouting (sadness) expressions in separate clusters (Fig. 2C, clusters 4 and 
6, respectively) compared to the free sorting solution where those expressions ended up in the 
same cluster (Fig. 2A, cluster 5). For Himba participants, conceptually anchored sorting did not 
yield a dramatically more universal cluster solution. Nonetheless, the MDS analyses indicated 
that the emotions words did influence the sorting behavior of Himba participants in more subtle 
ways.  Specifically, we found that facial expressions depicting emotion categories were more 
tightly clustered together in multidimensional space for Himba participants exposed to emotion 
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word anchors compared to Himba participants who freely sorted the faces into piles (Fig. 5A, C); 
this increase in clustering was most apparent for smiling and neutral faces. For US participants 
(Fig. 5B, C), there was little change in the distances between within-category facial expressions. 
As in the free sorting data, the MDS dimensions anchoring the US cognitive map were 
identified in emotion terms, reflecting that US participants were making mental state inferences 
about the facial expressions (see Table 2, Tables S10 & S11 for F-tests). The Himba cognitive 
map for the anchored sort data was described more in terms of mental states when compared to 
the map representing the freely sorted faces. One of the three MDS dimensions was empirically 
identified in emotion terms, and two remained in behavioral terms (although, one of these 
dimensions was trending for emotion; P = .064). Taken together, these data indicate that emotion 
words have a powerful effect on emotion perception, even under relatively unconstrained task 
conditions. 
Discussion 
The Western cultural script for what it means to be human includes the ability to 
“recognize” emotional expressions in a universal way. Yet, as we have shown, small changes in 
experimental procedure disrupt evidence for universal emotion perception.  By comparing 
emotion perception in participants from maximally distinct cultural backgrounds, US participants 
and Himba participants from remote regions of Namibia with limited exposure to Western 
culture, we demonstrated that facial expressions are not universally “recognized” in emotional 
terms. Unlike prior experiments, we used a face-sorting task that allowed us to manipulate the 
influence of emotion concepts on how the faces were perceived. Without emotion concepts to 
structure perception, Himba individuals perceived the facial expressions as behaviors that do not 
have a necessary relationship to emotions, whereas US participants were more likely to perceive 
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the expressions in mental terms, as the presumed universal emotion categories. When words for 
emotion concepts were introduced into the perception task, participants from both cultures 
grouped the facial expressions in way that better resembled the presumed “universal” solution, 
although this solution was more in evidence for US participants than for Himba participants. For 
Himba participants, the difference between free and conceptually anchored solutions was more 
subtle, and consistent with recent evidence demonstrating that people from different cultures 
vary in their internal, mental representations of emotional expressions (25).   
Although we report only one study in this paper, our findings do not stand alone.  They 
are consistent with a growing body of evidence that emotions are not “recognized” but are 
perceived via a complex set of processes (14) that involve the interplay of different brain 
networks, such as those for action identification and mental state inference (26, 27). Our finding 
that the “universal” pattern of emotion perception appears to be linguistically relative is 
consistent with the pattern of published results (see Table 1), as well as our own laboratory 
research showing that experimentally decreasing the accessibility of emotion words’ semantic 
meaning, using a procedure called “semantic satiation”(28), reduces the accuracy with which 
produce the presumed universal pattern of emotion perception (23) because words help to shape 
the underlying perceptual representation of those faces (22). Our current findings are consistent 
with research on patients with semantic deficits due to progressive neurodegeneration (i.e., 
semantic dementia) or brain injury (i.e., semantic aphasia), who do not perceive emotions in 
scowls, pouts, smiles and so on (29, 30). Even research in young children points to the 
importance of emotion words in emotion perception, because the universal pattern of emotion 
perception emerges in young children as they acquire conceptual categories for emotions that are 
anchored by emotion words (31). Taken together, these findings challenge the assumption that 
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facial expressions are evolved, universal “signals” of emotion, and instead suggest that facial 
expressions are culturally-sensitive “signs” (14, 32). To properly understand how humans 
perceive emotion, we must attempt to move past the Western cultural model as the assumed 
model for people everywhere. 
The present findings are not readily explained by a universality account of emotion 
recognition, even those that admit some minor cultural variability. It has been suggested, for 
example, that in addition to universal recognition abilities cultures have “display rules” (1) that 
allow people to regulate their expressions. Cultures are also thought have “decoding rules” (33) 
that govern how people report on their perceptions of emotion to maintain a culturally 
appropriate response (e.g., in Japanese culture, individuals will discount the intensity of emotion 
perceived and report that another person is feeling less intensely). Neither display nor decoding 
rule accounts have the predictive power in explaining the language-based effects we observed in 
the present study, or in any of the publishing findings demonstrating that, in US samples, the 
presumed universal solution can be disrupted by interfering with emotion word processing. 
Display and decoding rules, as instantiations of culture, are relatively rigid and would not predict 
that emotion perceptions vary based on momentarily accessible concepts.  
Our own study is not without limitations. Although our stimuli were posed by individuals 
of African origin, the expressions may not be isomorphic with the expressions that Himba 
individuals typically make in everyday life. Future work should explore this possibility. 
Furthermore, additional research on Himba lexical categories is needed. It is possible that the 
Herero translation for emotion words used in our study are recently borrowed, as appears to be 
the case for the color term "burou", borrowed from the German 'blau' also meaning blue. This 
might explain why Himba participants infrequently used discrete emotion words to label their 
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piles, as well as the reduced potency of words to shape the perception of facial expressions. To 
that end, it would also be important to know the actual frequency with which Himba speakers 
use emotion words in everyday discourse (which could speak to how functional those words are 
for shaping perception), and the extent to Himba individuals engage in action identification vs 
mental state inference more broadly. Our results suggest that Himba speakers might effectively 
use behavior categories for making predictions about future actions and their consequences, 
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Table 1. Summary of Prior Universality Studies that Tested Individuals from Remote Cultural Contexts.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Note. Adapted from Elfenbein & Ambady (2002). N = no; Y = yes; n/a = not applicable. “Conceptual Content” column indicates 
whether conceptual content for emotions (typically in the form of situation vignettes) was explicitly included within experimental 
trials. *Computed based on reported data (mean accuracy not weighted by sample sizes per condition because not reported). 	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Table 2.  Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) Dimensions Identified using Hierarchical Multiple Regressions   
  Dimension 1  Dimension 2  Dimension 3  Dimension 4 
Sort 
Solution 
 Behavior Emotion  Behavior Emotion  Behavior Emotion  Behavior Emotion 
Himba 
Free 
 .826*** .064  .732*** .060  .597*** .122    
US Free  .938*** .021  .885*** .078***  .913*** .028  .776*** .105* 
Himba 
Anchored 
 .865*** .055  .803*** .100*  .704*** .091    
US 
Anchored 
 .854*** .098***  .926*** .032*  .786*** .137**  .851*** .080** 
Note. The first block of regressors was comprised of eight sets of independent ratings where the 36 face stimuli were rated for the 
extent to which they depicted specific behaviors (e.g., smelling, crying; see Tables S1, S2; SOM for details); R2 values are presented 
in the Behavior column under each dimension. The second block of regressors was comprised of six sets of ratings where each of the 
36 faces was rated for the extent to which they represented emotions (e.g., disgust, sadness); the change in R2 due to these ratings is 
presented under each dimension labeled Emotion.  The change in R2 reflects the extent to which the dimension reflects mental state 
inferences about emotion over and above the variance accounted for by mere action identification. Himba sorting data was captured by 
a lower dimensionality solution compared to US sorting data (3 dimensions instead of 4).  As a result, a fourth dimension was only 
identified for US participants’ data.  Significant effects are bolded; * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001. 
	  	  
 
Fig. 1. Faces posed in typical Western-style expressions for emotions. 
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Fig. 2. The results of the six-cluster solutions from the hierarchical cluster analyses.  Data are 
plotted in A-D with cluster on the x-axis. The y-axis represents the number of items grouped into 
a given cluster, with contents stacked by the emotion portrayed in each posed facial expression. 
Stacked bars containing several different colors indicate that faces portraying different discrete 
emotions were clustered together. Bars with a single color (or predominance of a given color) 
indicate relatively clean clustering of faces depicting one emotion category. The US free sort (A) 
cluster solution contains relatively “universal” clustering with the exception of cluster five, 
which appears to contain portrayals of both disgust and sadness. The Himba free sort (B) has 
three clear clusters (one through three). Both US (C) and Himba (D) conceptually anchored 






Fig. 3. Pile labels produced by Himba and US participants. Mean number of words produced by 
each group (± standard error) is plotted on the y-axis broken down by word type. We observed 
cross-cultural differences in label use when participants were asked to freely sort facial 
expressions, (F1,55=24.952, P<.001, ηp2 =.312), and this effect was qualified by the type of label 
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Fig. 4. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) solutions for free sorting of facial expressions. Data are 
plotted in two-dimensional space for Himba (A) and US (B) participants. Items are plotted by 
emotion type. Clearer evidence of the “universal solution” (closer clustering of facial expressions 
within the same emotion category) is more evident in the US solution than in the Himba solution. 
Additional dimensions are plotted for Himba (C) and US participants (D, E). For Himba 
participants, scowls (“anger” faces) were perceived differently than other negative expressions 
(C), but are not themselves tightly clustered together in multidimensional space. For US 
participants, wide-eyed (“fear”) and wrinkle-nosed (“disgust”) expressions are more clearly 
separated (D) as well as pouts (“sadness”) and scowls (“anger”) (E) in these additional plots. We 
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quantified the clustering of items within a category across all dimensions and plotted these mean 





Fig. 5. MDS solutions for conceptually anchored sorting of facial expressions.  Data are plotted 
in two-dimensional space for Himba (A) and US (B) participants. Interface distances (C) were 
quantified across all dimensions and plotted for each cultural group and each task version 











Materials and Methods:  
Participants. Participants were 65 individuals (32 male, 33 female; mean age= 30.84, 
SD=13.04) from the Himba ethnic group of Otji-Herero speakers. 11 Himba participants were 
excluded from analysis (resulting in a final sample of 54 participants) based on compliance (i.e., 
4 participants decided not to finish sorting the stimuli), failure to sort into piles by emotion (2 
participants) and feasibility (3 participants—one with low visual acuity, two with an inability to 
sort the stimuli at all and low forward span in a separate experiment). In addition, 2 participants’ 
data were dropped from further analysis due to data recording issues that were discovered during 
data entry (i.e., not all image placements were recorded).  
Individuals from the Himba ethnic group constitute a strong sample for the two-culture 
approach (6) to test the universality of emotion perception. Most of the Himba ethnic group lives 
in an ancestrally “traditional” culture, such that they do not take part in their country’s political 
or economic systems, but rather live as semi-nomadic pastorialists, tending to herds of goats and 
cattle in remote regions of the Kaokoland (or Kunene region). Studying emotion perception in 
the Himba is additionally important given a recent paper concluding that Himba and British 
individuals have universal emotion perception in non-word human vocalizations (10). In our 
study, Himba participant data was collected in two remote villages, both located in the 
Mountainous Northwest region of Namibia, Kunene. The first village contained a mobile school 
as well as a missionary church; all members of the village otherwise lived traditionally and did 
not show significant signs of Westernization. The second village did not contain an established 
school or outside presence in the community. Both locations were far from the regional towns, 
and there was no evidence of tourism to these communities as is typical of “show” villages closer 
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to the main regional town of Opuwo. While several of the participants (particularly in location 1) 
had some conversational English (greetings), none of the participants were English language 
speakers. All participants in this sample were native speakers of the Otji-Herero language. 
Our US participants were 68 individuals (30 male, 38, female; mean age=38.27; 
sd=12.77) from an American community sample tested at the Boston Museum of Science in the 
Living Laboratory environment (http://www.mos.org/discoverycenter/livinglab). One 
participant’s data were dropped from further analysis due to data recording issues that were 
discovered during data entry (i.e., not all image placements were recorded). The Living 
Laboratory is a well-suited site for the collection of control data given the hectic environment 
that mirrors the busy and often social context of testing out in the field. In addition, the Living 
Laboratory affords the collection of data from a community sample, such that individuals from a 
range of ages and backgrounds can be included. 
Stimuli. Stimuli were 4x6 cards containing photographs of facial expressions of emotion posed 
by African American individuals. Stimuli were selected based on the following criteria. (1) The 
facial structure of the identities included in the stimulus set were rated as closest to that of 
several example with-in gender identities from the Himba ethnic group (as judged by a set of 120 
perceivers from a largely Western cultural context using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system); 
the final set of face stimuli (three male and three female identities) were selected from a larger 
set of 23 male and 20 female identities from Gur (34), IASLab (www.affective-science.org), and 
NimStim (http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm) face sets. (2) A given identity posed a facial 
expression depicting anger, fear, sadness, disgust, neutral affect, and happiness, with a final 
stimulus set of 36 faces. Each face stimulus was edited in Adobe Photoshop such that visual 
background information was removed. A uniform white collar (as is found on NimStim 
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identities) was added to all photographs in order to make the stimuli uniform and remove 
variation that might distract from facial actions. (3) Additional norming conducted on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk confirmed that the face stimuli were indeed rated as depicting the expected 
emotion (Table S2).  
Procedure. All participants were consented prior to performing experiment. Participants from 
the Himba ethnic group were verbally consented with the use of a translator. Participants within 
each culture were randomly assigned to either the free sorting or anchored sorting condition.  In 
the free sorting condition, participants were instructed as follows (through a translator for Himba 
participants):  “I am going to hand you a pile of cards. The people on these cards are feeling 
some different types of emotions. I want you to put people who feel the same way into a pile 
together. So, if you see two people who both feel the same emotion, they should end up together 
in the same pile. People who feel different emotions should be put in different piles. You can 
create as many piles as you need to. In the end, everyone in a pile should feel exactly the same 
way. You can look at all of the pictures first, before you start sorting, if you want to see the 
different types of emotions that the people are feeling. You can always move people into a 
different pile if you change your mind. This is not timed, so you can take as long as you need. 
Do you have any questions?”  The participant was then allowed to freely sort the images into 
piles. Participants were reinstructed if initial sorting appeared to be based on identity, rather than 
emotion (this took place in less than 25% of Himba participants). All but 2 participants were able 
to sort by emotion following reinstruction.  
Participants in the word-anchored sort condition heard slightly modified instructions 
(again, via the translator for Himba participants).  Differences from the unanchored instructions 
are italicized: “I am going to hand you a pile of cards. We think you will find that people on these 
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cards are feeling one of six different emotions. Those emotions are: anger, fear, sadness, disgust, 
neutral and happy. I want you to put people who feel the same way into a pile together. So, if 
you see two people who both feel the same thing, they should end up together in the same pile. 
People who feel different emotions should be put in different piles. You can create as many piles 
as you need to. In the end, everyone in a pile should feel exactly the same way. You can look at 
all of the pictures first, before you start sorting, if you want to see the different types of emotions 
that the people are feeling. You can always move people into a different pile if you change your 
mind. Do you have any questions?  We are going to remind you of the six emotions as you sort 
the faces. When we remind you, it doesn’t mean that you are doing well or doing poorly at 
sorting the faces. Instead we just give a reminder every so often. If you want a reminder of the 
six emotions at any point, just tell us and we will give you the words again. I’m going to give you 
the emotions to look for again and then you can start sorting. Anger, fear, sadness, disgust, 
neutral and happiness.”  Anchors were delivered verbally to all participants, rather than written, 
because the Himba participants we tested are from a pre-literate culture. 
To ensure that the emotion concepts remained accessible throughout the task, participants 
were reminded of the six emotions every 6 cards that they placed down.  If the participant 
initially looked through the stimuli before beginning to sort, they were also reminded every six 
stimuli that were closely examined by the participant.  In total, each participant was reminded of 
the emotion labels at least 6 times (including the initial instruction) and in some cases more 
depending on how much they looked through the stimuli initially, modified their piles and asked 
for reminders. For American participants, a few modifications to the anchoring protocol were set 
in place based on piloting. American participants were given the option of waiving further 
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repetition of the list of emotion terms if they 1) indicated that they did not wish to hear it again 
and 2) were able to repeat the list back to the experimenter without error.  
Once sorting was complete, all participants (regardless of culture or task version) were 
asked provide a label to describe the content of each pile. This question was initially phrased in 
an open-ended manner (i.e., “What is in this pile?”) in order to minimize expectancy effects 
regarding what type of content to produce. The experimenter recorded any behavioral descriptors 
or mental state descriptors that the participant produced. All participants were also asked 
specifically for facial expression and emotion labels that were not spontaneously provided by 
participants during open-ended questioning.  Since many Himba participants failed to provide 
additional information in response to these prompts, prompted responses (both for American and 
Himba samples) were not subjected to further analysis.  
Details of Analysis Approaches Reported in Main Text: 
Cluster Analysis.  A hierarchical cluster analysis (35) produces a set of nested clusters 
organized in a hierarchical tree.  Unlike other clustering procedures (e.g., k-means; 36), the 
number of clusters can be discovered rather than being pre-specified.  We used an agglomerative 
approach, starting with each item as its own cluster and progressively linking those items 
together based on an estimate of their distance from one another (computed from the number of 
times face stimuli appeared in the same vs separate piles; see second paragraph in this section). 
We employed a cluster distance measure of average linkage because it balances the limitations of 
single and complete linkage methods, which can be influenced by noise and outliers or force 
clusters with similar diameters, respectively (37). The average linkage clustering method uses 
information about all pairs of distances to assign cluster membership, not just the nearest or the 
furthest item pairs. We performed a cluster analysis on the data from each cultural group 
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separately, further broken down by sorting condition, resulting in four different MDS solutions:  
Himba Free Sort, Himba Anchored Sort, US Free Sort, and US Anchored Sort.  
To accomplish the cluster analysis, for each of the four conditions, we computed a co-
occurrence matrix (38). Each co-occurance matrix contained a row and column for each of the 36 
items in the set, resulting in a 36 x 36 symmetric matrix. Each cell in the matrix represented the 
number of times a given pair of face items was grouped by participants into the same pile (i.e., 
across participants). The larger the number in a cell, the more frequently those two items co-
occurred, and thus the higher perceived similarity between those items at a group level. To 
perform the cluster analysis, we then converted this co-occurrence similarity matrix into a 
distance matrix, where a higher cell value was an indication of less similarity between items. The 
cluster analysis was then performed on each dissimilarity matrix and we examined the resulting 
dendrogram for each (Fig. S1, S2).  Based on the observed increases in within cluster average 
item distance when the solution contained less than six clusters, (i.e., as items were grouped into 
larger, increasingly inclusive clusters, the clusters became less coherent), and for theoretical 
reasons (since 6 discrete expression portrayals were included in the set), we report the six-cluster 
solutions in the main text. 
Multidimensional Scaling. Each co-occurrence matrix (i.e., the similarity matrix) was also 
subjected to an ALSCAL multidimensional scaling procedure (39).  MDS provides an n-
dimensional map that represents the similarities and dissimilarities between the face stimuli.  
Based on the stress-by-dimensionality plots for solutions between one and six dimensions (Fig. 
S3), a four dimensional solution was selected as the best fit for the two US data (free sorting and 
anchored) and a three dimensional solution was selected as the best fit for the two Himba data 
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(free sorting and anchored).  The multidimensional plots are presented in Figs. 4 and 5 within the 
main text. 
To empirically identify the MDS dimensions (rather than to label them subjectively), 14 
independent groups of participants rated the 36 images in the stimulus set to estimate the extent 
to which each face depicted a given behavior (crying, frowning, laughing, looking, pouting, 
scowling, smelling, and smiling; Table S2) or a given emotion as a mental state (anger, fear, 
disgust, sadness, neutral and happiness; Table S3). Each group of 40 participants rated the 36 
faces on one property only, resulting in a total of 560 participants.  Ratings for each property 
were on a Likert scale ranging from 1 “not at all” to 5 “extremely”. The images were rated by 
participants recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (40) and restricted to IP addresses located 
in North America.  Since our experiments on Mechanical Turk would not allow for us to collect 
responses by Himba individuals, we decided to limit our normative ratings to the US cultural 
context. This allows us to test the applicability of the US cultural model of emotions (captured 
by these ratings) to both US and Himba cultural contexts. We computed the mean property rating 
for each image resulting in 14 attribute vectors with 36 means, which we then used to 
empirically identify the MDS dimensions (following 20). In a series of hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses, we examined the extent to which behavior and emotion vectors explained 
variance in the MDS dimension coordinates for each dimension. By entering behavior vectors as 
the first block of predictors, and the emotion vectors as the second block, we were able to 
estimate the extent to which each dimension captured mental state (emotion) inferences (e.g., 
sadness) over and above merely describing the physical action of a face (e.g., pouting).  
Following action identification theory (17, 18), behavior vectors were always entered as the first 
block of predictors, and emotion vectors as the second. We performed a series of F-tests (Table 
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S4, S5, S6, S7) examining whether the behavior vectors sufficiently explained a given MDS 
dimension, and whether discrete emotion vectors accounted for that dimension over and above 
behaviors.  A summary of the dimension variance accounted for by the behavioral and emotion 
vectors is presented in Table 2 in the main text. 
Pile Label Analyses.  We tallied the number of discrete emotional words that a given participant 
generated when anchoring their face piles. Synonyms (e.g., frustrated) were assigned to the 
closest discrete emotion category (e.g., anger) and included in the tally. This was done for both 
US and Himba data in the free sorting condition in order to examine how participants were 
spontaneously structuring their piles in the absence of emotion concept words (imposed in the 
conceptually anchored condition).  Himba responses were recorded based on exact translations 
(rather than a summary) provided by the translator. In addition, we tallied the number of 
behavioral descriptors (e.g., looking, smelling, laughing, crying, smiling) used to anchor each 
pile. Finally, we also tallied the number of other “mental state” words were used by participants 
from a given cultural context. For the Himba participants, this count included a number of words 
that do not directly translate as “emotion” terms, but were produced by a large majority of 
participants in response to prompting to describe the emotional state of the individuals grouped 
into a given pile. These terms translated to “cool”, “death”, “quiet”, and “wonder”.  For 
participants in the free sorting condition frequency counts for each type of word label used was 
subjected to a mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) of cultural group (US, Himba) by 
word type (discrete emotion, behavioral, culture-specific terms) with word type as a within-
subject variable. The results of this ANOVA are summarized in the main text and Fig. 3. 
Emotion Accuracy and Discrimination Analyses: 
In typical studies of the universality hypothesis, researchers compute the extent to which 
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each facial expression is “accurately” perceived, meaning the extent to which participants 
perceived the posed face in the way agrees with the experimenter’s expectations.  “Accuracy” is 
defined in a number of ways, most typically do participant responses match the intended emotion 
portrayed by the individual emitting a cue.  In our experiment, we defined “accuracy” as the 
number of faces from a given emotion category that comprised the “dominant” content in a pile. 
This score allowed for items from the same category to be broken up into multiple piles and also 
allowed singletons (i.e., images that are placed alone and not grouped with other items) to be 
counted as “accurate”. Accuracy was defined as the percentage of items that were grouped 
together by discrete emotion category and made up the majority of the content in a given pile. 
Himba participants had lower accuracy for sorting discrete emotion faces together with a mean 
accuracy of 49.615% (SD=33.559) compared to American participants, 67.101 % (SD=22.350), 
(F1,56=53.412, P < 0.001; for means see Table S8). Lower discrete emotion sorting accuracy was 
found regardless of emotion portrayal type. A mixed-model analysis of variance, with accuracy 
as the dependent variable, emotion portrayal type as the repeated measure (portrayals of anger, 
fear, sadness, disgust, neutral and happiness) and cultural group as the between participants 
factor (American or Himba) did not yield a significant interaction, (F5,280=.816, P = 0.510, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), indicating that any impact of exposure to words did not differ by 
culture. In both Himba and US cultures, discrete sorting accuracy was marginally higher for 
participants exposed to words (M=58.576, SD=24.669) than participants who were not 
(M=54.223, SD=25.158),  (F1,118 = 3.422, P = 0.067; for means see Table S8). 
Discrimination scores for each emotion category were computed as the maximum 
number of faces from a given category that were grouped together into a pile, divided by the total 
number of faces within that pile. Discrimination scores represent how cleanly participants groups 
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items from a given emotion category into a single pile. Discrimination scores more clearly reflect 
grouping of faces by emotion category; accuracy can be driven by more simplistic perceptual 
matching of faces. For example, some sadness portrayals included in the set had open mouth 
frowns, whereas others had closed mouth frowns.  If simple feature matching occurred, the open 
and closed mouth expressions would be grouped into different piles. This sorting strategy would 
negatively impact a discrimination score (because less sadness portrayals would ultimately be 
grouped together) but not an accuracy score (because both piles still contained sad dominant 
images and thus all of those items would count as accurate). Himba participants were less able to 
discriminate between discrete emotions, with a mean discrimination proportion of .644 
(SD=0.276) compared to US participants .740 (SD=0.196), (F1,56=30.766, P < 0.001; for means 
see Table S9). Lower discrimination for Himba participants was found regardless of emotion 
portrayal type. A mixed-model analysis of variance, with discrimination as the dependent 
variable, emotion type as the repeated measure (portrayals of anger, fear, sadness, disgust, 
neutral and happiness) and cultural group as the between participants factor (American or 
Himba) did not yield a significant interaction, (F5,280=1.373, P = 0.248, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected).  In both Himba and US cultures, emotion words did not help participants to sort into 




Figures and Legends: 
	  
Fig. S1. Cluster analysis dendrograms for US (A) and Himba (B) participants’ free sorting data. 
As an increasing number of items are included in a cluster, the more inclusive cluster also 
increases the average distance within the cluster.  As each cluster (which starts out as a single 
item) is united with another cluster (i.e., agglomerated), this is indicated in the dendrogram by a 
bracket.  The longer the bracket between two clusters (i.e., the bigger the distance before two 
clusters are joined), the more spread out the newly formed cluster is (i.e., the bigger the 
difference between the items joining the new cluster). The average distance within a cluster is 
generally lower for US participants than for Himba participants (evidenced by the longer 
brackets early even at the first stage of clustering in the Himba data), and this is particularly 
evident in clusters of happy, fearful and neutral items, which all have relatively small average 
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cluster distances for US participants.  In both cluster solutions, the happy portrayals are most 
tightly clustered together (indicated by the very short brackets between happy items) indicating 
that across both cultures the perceived similarity between happy items is greater than within 




Fig. S2. Cluster analysis dendrograms for US (A) and Himba (B) participants’ anchored sorting 
data. See Fig. S1 for an overview of how to read these dendrograms.  For the US participants, a 
relatively clear 6-cluster solution emerged, such that an average cluster distance below 20 is 






Fig. S3. Stress-by-Dimension (A) and RSQ-by-dimension (B) plots for multidimensional scaling 
(MDS) solutions for the four sorting conditions. The number of dimensions in a given solution is 
plotted on the x-axis. A clear elbow in the plots is visible for US data at four dimensions, 
indicating that a 4D solution optimally fits the US data. Himba data have an earlier, although less 








Table S1. Correlations between Emotion and Behavior Ratings across the 36 Face Stimuli.  
Attribute Rated 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
1. Anger  0.121 .750** 0.261 -0.238 -.685** 0.078 .812** -.622** 0.123 .746** .945** .512** -.653** 
2. Fear   .473** .519** -.402* -.563** .398* .388* -.508** .336* 0.204 0.124 0.168 -.515** 
3. Disgust    .444** -.489** -.690** 0.283 .853** -.588** 0.165 .675** .839** .782** -.614** 
4. Sadness     -0.122 -.652** .878** .672** -.581** -0.307 .671** .333* 0.072 -.588** 
5. Neutral      -0.064 -0.227 -.365* -0.211 -.684** -0.276 -0.268 -.639** -0.178 
6. Happiness       -.376* -.781** .979** 0.197 -.663** -.687** -0.195 .986** 
7. Crying        .491** -0.295 -0.307 .505** 0.126 0.086 -0.297 
8. Frowning         -.679** -0.018 .928** .878** .532** -.703** 
9. Laughing          0.26 -.577** -.610** -0.098 .991** 
10. Looking           -0.109 0.037 0.313 0.226 
11. Pouting            .817** .452** -.598** 
12. Scowling             .614** -.640** 
13. Smelling              -0.124 
14. Smiling               
Note. Correlations among mean emotion ratings (not bolded) are consistent with physical and affective similarities between face 
stimuli (e.g., anger and disgust are both high arousal negative emotions and both are portrayed with a furrowed brow).  Correlations 
among mean behavior ratings (not bolded) are consistent with similarities between the physical manifestations of those behaviors on 
the face (e.g., crying is correlated with both frowns and pouts). Correlations between behavior and emotion vectors (bolded) indicate 
that behaviors (action identification) are not redundant with emotions (mental state inference) and that a single behavior is associated 
with more than one emotion. For example, both anger and disgust ratings were correlated with ratings of smelling.  ** = p ≤ .05, ** = 
p ≤ .01.  Findings like this call into question the routine practice of equating action identification with emotion perception in cross-
cultural studies that claim support for the universality hypothesis. For example, most experiments conducted in remote cultural 
samples (1, 8-10) (Table 1), participants were provided with a situational frame including action identification information such as 
“He (she) is looking at something which smells bad”. This situational frame was presented along with two to three facial expressions, 
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for example a face with a nose-wrinkle portraying disgust and a pouting face portraying sadness; participants, on average, choose the 
disgust face. It is typically assumed that selecting the nose-wrinkled face supports the conclusion that the perceiver correctly 
“recognized” the expression of a mental state of “disgust”.  These findings, along with our Himba data, suggest another interpretation: 
participants might have engaged in action identification rather than in mental state inference and selected a face that appeared to be 
engaged in a situationally-tuned behavior (e.g. smelling).  That is, action identification by individuals from distinct cultural contexts 
might be mistakenly treated as evidence of universal emotion recognition.
	  	  
Table S2. Mean Behavior Ratings for Face Stimuli   
Note. Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare multiple behaviors within a given emotion portrayal type.  Items with 
the same superscript did not differ statistically from one another (i.e., p >.05).  Bolded items are the highest rated behavior (or set of 
behaviors) for a given emotion portrayal type. For example, anger portrayals were equivalently and most strongly associated with 
frowning, looking and scowling behaviors.


















Mean 1.24a 3.12b 1.07c 3.33b 2.74d 3.34b 2.26e 1.14c 
Anger 
(SD) (.12) (.52) (.12) (.48) (.61) (.78) (.29) (.21) 
Mean 1.43a 2.53b 1.02c 3.98d 1.86e 2.25f 2.39g 1.10h Fear 
 (SD) (.52) (.47) (.03) (.25) (.31) (.28) (.12) (.06) 
Mean 1.67a 3.32b 1.15c 3.24b 2.75d 3.39b 3.21b 1.29e Disgust 
 (SD) (.49) (.62) (.19) (.35) (.73) (.55) (.48) (.34) 
Mean 2.31ad 3.11b 1.05c 3.07b 2.98b 2.43a 2.08d 1.14e Sadness 
 (SD) (1.11) (.48) (.10) (.19) (.70) (.64) (.22) (.17) 
Mean 1.17a 1.61b 1.10c 2.87d 1.44e 1.81f 1.79f 1.29g Neutral 
 (SD) (.07) (.24) (.07) (.17) (.11) (.21) (.12) (.25) 
Mean 1.02a 1.01b 3.28c 3.66d 1.01b 1.11e 2.19f 4.24g Happiness 
 (SD) (.02) (.02) (.38) (.18) (.01) (.09) (.11) (.48) 
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Note. Ratings on the diagonal (bolded) are ratings on the scale that a given facial pose was meant to portray. Independent samples t-
tests (2-tailed) were conducted comparing the ratings of each emotion portrayal type on the target emotion scale (bolded) against each 
of the other rating scales. All comparisons were statistically significant, indicating that perceiver-based ratings were consistent with 
the intended portrayal type (across all categories).  Non-zero ratings on other scales aside from the intended portrayal, are consistent 
with prior normative data suggesting that canonical facial expressions can still be perceived in line with other emotions, particularly 
those that are perceptually (41) and affectively similar to one another. **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001	  














Mean 3.23 1.59*** 2.54** 2.13*** 2.20*** 1.29*** 
Anger 
(SD) (.80) (.91) (1.16) (1.11) (.87) (.50) 
Mean 2.21*** 3.87 2.76*** 2.38*** 1.22*** 1.22*** 
Fear 
(SD) (1.10) (.95) (1.31) (1.08) (.60) (.48) 
Mean 2.92** 2.12** 3.70 2.40*** 1.36*** 1.30*** 
Disgust 
(SD) (1.12) (1.06) (.99) (1.11) (.67) (.52) 
Mean 2.19*** 2.48*** 2.22*** 3.40 2.05*** 1.23*** 
Sadness 
(SD) (.97) (1.09) (1.05) (.93) (.94) (.43) 
Mean 1.81*** 1.49*** 1.46*** 1.81*** 4.04 1.71*** 
Neutral 
(SD) (.78) (.68) (.66) (.80) (.97) (.66) 
Mean 1.04*** 1.00*** 1.05*** 1.06*** 1.56*** 4.17 
Happiness 
(SD) (.22) (.0) (.22) (.29) (.97) (.68) 
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Table S4. Dimension Identification: US Free Sort Data	  
  Model 1 (Behavior) Model 2 (Behavior + Emotion) 
Dimension Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
1 Crying 0.067 0.166 0.037 0.378 0.268 0.211 
 Frowning 0.107 0.277 0.086 0.043 0.404 0.035 
 Laughing -0.467 0.546 -0.334 -0.581 0.562 -0.416 
 Looking 0.679 0.16 0.264*** 0.393 0.329 0.153 
 Pouting -0.076 0.195 -0.056 0.075 0.334 0.056 
 Scowling -0.263 0.217 -0.208 0.16 0.364 0.126 
 Smelling 0.905 0.176 0.386*** 0.538 0.373 0.229 
 Smiling 1.081 0.403 1.079* 0.418 0.539 0.417 
 Anger    -0.466 0.308 -0.344 
 Disgust    -0.011 0.376 -0.009 
 Fear    0.05 0.226 0.043 
 Sad    -0.491 0.267 -0.363 
 Neutral    -0.306 0.197 -0.272 
 Happiness    0.629 0.714 0.582 
 R2  .938   .958  
 F for change in R2  50.700***   1.716  
        
2 Crying -0.236 0.211 -0.14 0.176 0.238 0.104 
 Frowning -1.174 0.353** -1.011 -0.148 0.358 -0.127 
 Laughing 0.03 0.697 0.023 -0.332 0.498 -0.253 
 Looking -1.245 0.204*** -0.514 0.039 0.292 0.016 
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 Pouting 0.883 0.249** 0.697 0.25 0.296 0.197 
 Scowling 0.649 0.277* 0.544 0.371 0.322 0.311 
 Smelling -0.863 0.224** -0.391 -0.166 0.331 -0.075 
 Smiling 0.516 0.513 0.548 0.46 0.478 0.489 
 Anger    -0.276 0.273 -0.217 
 Disgust    -0.327 0.333 -0.274 
 Fear    -0.573 0.201 -0.521** 
 Sad    0.032 0.237 0.025 
 Neutral    0.377 0.175 0.357 
 Happiness    -0.002 0.633 -0.002* 
 R2  .885   .963  
 F for change in R2  26.058***   7.300***  
        
3 Crying -0.094 0.156 -0.066 -0.388 0.255 -0.271 
 Frowning 0.255 0.261 0.26 -0.184 0.383 -0.187 
 Laughing -0.475 0.515 -0.427 -0.067 0.533 -0.061 
 Looking 0.522 0.151 0.255** 0.179 0.312 0.088 
 Pouting -0.663 0.184 -0.617** -0.418 0.317 -0.389 
 Scowling -0.852 0.205 -0.842*** -0.857 0.345 -0.848* 
 Smelling -0.118 0.166 -0.063 -0.154 0.354 -0.082 
 Smiling -0.215 0.38 -0.269 0.474 0.511 0.594 
 Anger    0.428 0.292 0.397 
 Disgust    0.133 0.357 0.132 
 Fear    0.397 0.215 0.426 
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 Sad    0.214 0.253 0.199 
 Neutral    0.228 0.187 0.255 
 Happiness    -0.621 0.678 -0.721 
 R2  .913   .941  
 F for change in R2  35.236***   1.651  
        
4 Crying -0.59 0.2 -0.517** -0.107 0.288 -0.093 
 Frowning -0.366 0.335 -0.466 0.648 0.434 0.824 
 Laughing -0.161 0.66 -0.181 -0.406 0.604 -0.457 
 Looking 0.58 0.193 0.354** 0.511 0.354 0.312 
 Pouting 0.124 0.235 0.145 -0.434 0.359 -0.505 
 Scowling 0.717 0.262 0.887 1.232 0.391 1.524** 
 Smelling -0.666 0.212 -0.446** -0.045 0.401 -0.03 
 Smiling 0.062 0.486 0.097* -0.534 0.579 -0.837 
 Anger    -0.226 0.331 -0.263 
 Disgust    -0.977 0.404 -1.21* 
 Fear    0.257 0.243 0.345 
 Sad    -0.479 0.287 -0.556 
 Neutral    0.057 0.212 0.08 
 Happiness    0.887 0.768 1.288 
 R2  .776   .881  
 F for change in R2  11.669***   3.09*  
Note. Hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted to identify the derived dimensions from the MDS analyses.  Predictors were 
entered in blocks: Model 1 contained only behavior vectors as predictors; Model 2 contained both behavior and emotion vectors. 
Coefficients for each predictor within each model are presented as well as the relevant F-test for a significant change in prediction (R2) 
	   
124	  
between models. A separate regression was conducted for each dimension that resulted from the Multidimensional scaling of sorting 
data. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001 
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Table S5. Dimension Identification: Himba Free Sort Data  
  Model 1 (Behavior) Model 2 (Behavior + Discrete) 
Dimension Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
1 Crying -0.677 0.283 -0.369* -0.373 0.444 -0.203 
 Frowning -1.366 0.473 -1.081** -0.743 0.668 -0.588 
 Laughing -0.672 0.933 -0.47 -1.205 0.931 -0.843 
 Looking -0.627 0.273 -0.238* -0.116 0.545 -0.044 
 Pouting 1.306 0.333 0.946*** 1.167 0.553 0.846* 
 Scowling 0.066 0.371 0.051 0.05 0.603 0.038 
 Smelling -0.553 0.3 -0.23 -0.662 0.618 -0.276 
 Smiling 0.831 0.688 0.81 0.144 0.892 0.14 
 Anger    0.264 0.509 0.19 
 Disgust    0.476 0.623 0.367 
 Fear    0.344 0.375 0.287 
 Sad    0.095 0.442 0.069 
 Neutral    0.729 0.327 0.635* 
 Happiness    2.209 1.183 1.996 
 R2  .826   .890  
 F for change in R2  16.050***   2.051  
        
2 Crying -0.332 0.275 -0.231 -0.592 0.479 -0.412 
 Frowning 0.124 0.46 0.126 0.591 0.72 0.598 
 Laughing -0.67 0.907 -0.6 -0.718 1.003 -0.642 
 Looking -1.081 0.266 -0.525*** -0.439 0.587 -0.213 
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 Pouting 0.016 0.324 0.015 -0.714 0.595 -0.661 
 Scowling 0.34 0.36 0.335 0.415 0.649 0.409 
 Smelling -0.652 0.291 -0.347* 0.294 0.666 0.156 
 Smiling 0.261 0.668 0.325 0.856 0.962 1.067 
 Anger    -0.445 0.549 -0.41 
 Disgust    -0.928 0.671 -0.915 
 Fear    -0.684 0.404 -0.73 
 Sad    0.47 0.477 0.434 
 Neutral    -0.245 0.352 -0.273 
 Happiness    -1.567 1.275 -1.811 
 R2  .732   .792  
 F for change in R2  9.215***   1.012  
        
3 Crying -0.37 0.299 -0.291 -0.01 0.493 -0.008 
 Frowning -1.3 0.5 -1.484* -0.447 0.742 -0.511 
 Laughing -0.886 0.985 -0.895 -0.643 1.033 -0.649 
 Looking 0.733 0.289 0.402* 0.519 0.605 0.284 
 Pouting 1.38 0.352 1.443*** 1.055 0.613 1.103 
 Scowling 0.237 0.392 0.263 0.556 0.669 0.617 
 Smelling 0.1 0.317 0.06 0.846 0.686 0.508 
 Smiling 0.264 0.726 0.372 0.545 0.99 0.766 
 Anger    0.579 0.565 0.603 
 Disgust    -0.765 0.691 -0.851 
 Fear    0.924 0.416 1.114* 
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 Sad    -0.324 0.491 -0.338 
 Neutral    0.774 0.363 0.971* 
 Happiness    0.51 1.313 0.665 
 R2  .597   .719  
 F for change in R2  4.993***   1.525  
Note. Hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted to identify the derived dimensions from the MDS analyses.  Predictors were 
entered in blocks: Model 1 contained only behavior vectors as predictors; Model 2 contained both behavior and emotion vectors. 
Coefficients for each predictor within each model are presented as well as the relevant F-test for a significant change in prediction (R2) 
between models. A separate regression was conducted for each dimension that resulted from the Multidimensional scaling of sorting 
data. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001 
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Table S6. Dimension Identification: US Conceptually Anchored Sort Data 
  Model 1 (Behavior) Model 2 (Behavior + Discrete) 
Dimension Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
1 Crying -0.445 0.252 -0.25 0.364 0.287 0.204 
 Frowning -0.742 0.421 -0.605 0.22 0.432 0.179 
 Laughing 0.587 0.83 0.424 0.058 0.601 0.042 
 Looking -1.08 0.243 -0.423*** 0.15 0.352 0.059 
 Pouting 0.366 0.296 0.273 0.121 0.357 0.091 
 Scowling 0.412 0.33 0.327 -0.06 0.389 -0.048 
 Smelling -0.596 0.267 -0.256* -0.526 0.399 -0.226 
 Smiling 0.185 0.612 0.186 -0.569 0.576 -0.572 
 Anger    -0.203 0.329 -0.151 
 Disgust    0.337 0.402 0.268 
 Fear    -0.43 0.242 -0.37 
 Sad    -0.425 0.286 -0.317 
 Neutral    0.485 0.211 0.436* 
 Happiness    1.235 0.764 1.151 
 R2  .854   .951  
 F for change in R2  19.702***   7.034***  
        
2 Crying 0.114 0.178 0.064 -0.012 0.264 -0.007 
 Frowning 0.489 0.298 0.403 0.061 0.397 0.051 
 Laughing -0.641 0.587 -0.467 -0.742 0.553 -0.54 
 Looking 0.835 0.172 0.33*** 0.136 0.324 0.054 
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 Pouting -0.506 0.209 -0.382* -0.297 0.329 -0.224 
 Scowling -0.374 0.233 -0.299 0.098 0.358 0.078 
 Smelling 1.295 0.189 0.561*** 0.825 0.368 0.358* 
 Smiling 1.017 0.432 1.032* 0.476 0.531 0.483 
 Anger    -0.303 0.303 -0.227 
 Disgust    0.036 0.371 0.029 
 Fear    0.138 0.223 0.12 
 Sad    -0.115 0.263 -0.087 
 Neutral    -0.499 0.194 -0.452* 
 Happiness    0.567 0.704 0.533 
 R2  .926   .958  
 F for change in R2  41.931***   2.706*  
        
3 Crying 0.388 0.215 0.309 -0.599 0.255 -0.476* 
 Frowning 0.16 0.36 0.184 0.146 0.384 0.168 
 Laughing 0.204 0.709 0.208 -0.147 0.535 -0.15 
 Looking -0.538 0.208 -0.298* -0.35 0.313 -0.194 
 Pouting 0.275 0.253 0.291 -0.35 0.318 -0.37 
 Scowling -1.159 0.282 -1.302*** -0.875 0.346 -0.983* 
 Smelling 0.563 0.228 0.343* 1.107 0.356 0.673** 
 Smiling -0.29 0.523 -0.413 0.158 0.513 0.225 
 Anger    -0.018 0.293 -0.019 
 Disgust    -0.371 0.358 -0.417 
 Fear    -0.242 0.216 -0.294 
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 Sad    1.37 0.254 1.445*** 
 Neutral    -0.102 0.188 -0.13 
 Happiness    -0.226 0.68 -0.298 
 R2  .786   .923  
 F for change in R2  12.403***   6.202***  
        
4 Crying -0.146 0.178 -0.117 -0.12 0.239 -0.096 
 Frowning -0.337 0.297 -0.394 -0.233 0.359 -0.273 
 Laughing -0.781 0.586 -0.806 -0.312 0.5 -0.322 
 Looking 0.956 0.172 0.536*** 0.754 0.293 0.422* 
 Pouting 0.051 0.209 0.055 -0.15 0.297 -0.161 
 Scowling -0.654 0.233 -0.744** 0.299 0.324 0.34 
 Smelling -0.18 0.188 -0.111 0.36 0.333 0.222 
 Smiling 0.003 0.432 0.004 0.738 0.48 1.062 
 Anger    -0.217 0.274 -0.232 
 Disgust    -0.819 0.335 -0.932* 
 Fear    0.581 0.202 0.716** 
 Sad    -0.07 0.238 -0.075 
 Neutral    0.3 0.176 0.386 
 Happiness    -0.87 0.636 -1.161 
 R2  .851   .931  
 F for change in R2  19.228***   4.069**  
Note. Hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted to identify the derived dimensions from the MDS analyses.  Predictors were 
entered in blocks: Model 1 contained only behavior vectors as predictors; Model 2 contained both behavior and emotion vectors. 
Coefficients for each predictor within each model are presented as well as the relevant F-test for a significant change in prediction (R2) 
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between models. A separate regression was conducted for each dimension that resulted from the Multidimensional scaling of sorting 




Table S7. Dimension Identification: Himba Conceptually Anchored Sort Data 
  Model 1 (Behavior) Model 2 (Behavior + Discrete) 
Dimension Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
1 Crying -0.821 0.257 -0.434** -0.32 0.391 -0.169 
 Frowning -1.137 0.43 -0.873* -0.267 0.589 -0.205 
 Laughing -0.319 0.847 -0.217 -0.523 0.82 -0.355 
 Looking -0.962 0.248 -0.354*** -0.161 0.48 -0.059 
 Pouting 1.21 0.302 0.851*** 0.934 0.487 0.657 
 Scowling 0.189 0.337 0.141 -0.148 0.531 -0.11 
 Smelling -0.871 0.272 -0.352** -0.496 0.545 -0.2 
 Smiling 0.676 0.624 0.639 0.552 0.786 0.522 
 Anger    0.28 0.449 0.196 
 Disgust    0.045 0.549 0.033 
 Fear    0.08 0.33 0.065 
 Sad    -0.167 0.39 -0.117 
 Neutral    0.738 0.288 0.623* 
 Happiness    0.811 1.042 0.711 
 R2  .865   .920  
 F for change in R2  21.671***   2.393  
        
2 Crying -0.445 0.239 -0.305 -0.062 0.333 -0.043 
 Frowning -0.925 0.4 -0.921* 0.41 0.5 0.408 
 Laughing -0.655 0.789 -0.577 -1.04 0.697 -0.915 
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 Looking -0.127 0.231 -0.061 0.697 0.408 0.333 
 Pouting 1.091 0.282 0.995*** 0.325 0.414 0.296 
 Scowling 0.621 0.314 0.602 0.536 0.451 0.519 
 Smelling -0.125 0.254 -0.065 0.792 0.463 0.415 
 Smiling 0.165 0.582 0.203 -0.003 0.668 -0.004 
 Anger    0.162 0.381 0.147 
 Disgust    -0.624 0.466 -0.605 
 Fear    0.023 0.281 0.025 
 Sad    0.043 0.331 0.039 
 Neutral    0.641 0.245 0.702* 
 Happiness    0.838 0.886 0.953 
 R2  .803   .903  
 F for change in R2  13.776***   3.586*  
        
3 Crying -0.363 0.233 -0.313 0.077 0.383 0.067 
 Frowning -0.602 0.39 -0.756 -0.026 0.577 -0.032 
 Laughing -0.19 0.768 -0.211 -0.134 0.803 -0.149 
 Looking 1.2 0.225 0.722*** 0.854 0.47 0.514 
 Pouting 0.549 0.274 0.631 0.502 0.477 0.577 
 Scowling -0.017 0.305 -0.021 -0.06 0.52 -0.074 
 Smelling 0.21 0.247 0.139 0.427 0.534 0.282 
 Smiling -0.004 0.566 -0.006 -0.305 0.77 -0.471 
 Anger    0.456 0.44 0.522 
 Disgust    -0.311 0.538 -0.38 
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 Fear    0.574 0.324 0.76 
 Sad    -0.553 0.382 -0.634 
 Neutral    0.338 0.282 0.467 
 Happiness    0.873 1.021 1.25 
 R2  .704   .795  
 F for change in R2  8.029***   1.549  
 Note. Hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted to identify the derived dimensions from the MDS analyses.  Predictors were 
entered in blocks: Model 1 contained only behavior vectors as predictors; Model 2 contained both behavior and emotion vectors. 
Coefficients for each predictor within each model are presented as well as the relevant F-test for a significant change in prediction (R2) 
between models. A separate regression was conducted for each dimension that resulted from the Multidimensional scaling of sorting 




Table S8. Descriptive statistics for accuracy scores.  
Note. Means and standard deviations are presented.
  Free Sorting Anchored Sorting 







Anger      
 US 0.578 0.046 0.523 0.043 
 Himba 0.295 0.051 0.167 0.049 
Fear      
 US 0.818 0.045 0.792 0.043 
 Himba 0.506 0.05 0.512 0.048 
Sadness      
 US 0.344 0.049 0.62 0.046 
 Himba 0.103 0.055 0.25 0.053 
Disgust      
 US 0.469 0.047 0.644 0.044 
 Himba 0.314 0.052 0.339 0.05 
Happiness      
 US 0.99 0.033 0.991 0.031 
 Himba 0.75 0.036 0.732 0.035 
Neutral      
 US 0.828 0.051 0.912 0.048 
 Himba 0.513 0.057 0.548 0.055 
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Table S9. Descriptive Statistics for Discrimination Scores.	  	  
Note. Means and standard deviations are presented. 










Anger      
 US 0.612 0.037 0.659 0.035 
 Himba 0.455 0.042 0.427 0.04 
Fear      
 US 0.868 0.04 0.918 0.038 
 Himba 0.592 0.045 0.745 0.043 
Sadness      
 US 0.55 0.033 0.651 0.031 
 Himba 0.317 0.037 0.41 0.035 
Disgust      
 US 0.74 0.045 0.776 0.042 
 Himba 0.56 0.05 0.527 0.048 
Happiness      
 US 0.952 0.031 0.918 0.029 
 Himba 0.826 0.034 0.775 0.033 
Neutral      
 US 0.718 0.031 0.715 0.03 















Within Cultural Stability in Mental State Inference 
We examined whether the tendency to infer mental states from facial portrayals of 
emotion was dependent on instructions to focus on the mind.  We manipulated the focus 
of participants from a US cultural context on mental versus behavioral states and 




Mental State Attribution in Western Culture 
One of the central assumptions about social cognition in Western psychology is 
that people routinely and automatically understand human actions in terms of the mental 
states that supposedly caused those actions.  Spontaneously attending to the minds of 
others is considered central to normal functioning in Western culture (Bruner & Taguiri, 
1954; Mitchell, 2009). Likewise, failure to attend to mental states is considered a central 
symptom in some disorders, such as the autism spectrum, leading to disruptions in social 
functioning (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Distortions in mind perception have recently been 
identified in various forms of Western psychopathology such as schizotypy and 
psychopathy (Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein, & Wegner, 2011), lending further support to the 
notion that inferring mental states in others is central to one’s own mental health.  
In the Western conception of “emotion perception,” mental state inference is 
assumed to be the natural endpoint to the process. Emotion perception is often described 
as a cascade of “feed-forward” processing, driven by a clear external “signal” emitted 
non-verbally by another individual (Haxby et al., 2001). The perceiver’s nervous system 
has been described as evolved to “decode” these signals (Schyns, Petro, & Smith, 2009)i, 
such that the emotion perception is simply a recognition process, rather than an inference 
on the part of the perceiver. While mental state inference is assumed to occur in most 
models, and it is assumed that the ability to apply a label to a face is indicative of that 
inference, it is rarely explicitly discussed or measured. 
Mental state inference may not be as routine as models of emotion have often 
implied, however. Failure to engage in mind perception also occurs in the normal 
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population, and is thus not restricted to instances of pathology. That is, people vary in the 
extent to which they infer mental states in others as the cause of observable actions 
(Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006). This individual difference has been termed “action 
identification”. Individuals low in action identification tend to view actions in simple 
behavioral terms (e.g., eating might be described as chewing and swallowing), whereas 
individuals who are high in action identification infer the mental states and intentions 
behind actions (e.g., eating might be described as enjoying the taste of food). Further, the 
tendency to engage in mental state attribution is also based on the situational 
constraints—when behavior is more ambiguous in its causes this increases the likelihood 
that a mind will be inferred behind that behavior (Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010).  
The distinction between action perception and mental state inference has received 
relatively little attention in the behavioral literature on emotion perception. But recent 
models of emotion, motivated by the underlying neural networks involved, yield a far 
different picture from the “cascade” of processing implicit in some models of emotion.  
Instead, emotion perception is described as a product of the mutual interaction of more 
basic systems in the brain (Spunt & Lieberman, 2012; Zaki, Hennigan, Weber, & 
Ochsner, 2010), one involved broadly in action perception (often referred to as a 
mirroring network involving regions such as posterior inferior frontal gyrus, dorsal 
premotor cortex, and the inferior parietal lobule; although this network itself may be 
subdivided further), and another involved broadly in mental state inference (including 
regions such as the dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortices, posterior cingulate 
cortex/precuneus, temporoparietal parietal junction, the posterior superior temporal 
sulcus, and the anterior temporal cortex; although this network is not necessarily specific 
	   
140	  
for this function). Recent data suggests that these networks have increased functional 
connectivity to one another during emotion perception (Spunt & Lieberman, 2012). 
These two networks work in tandem to accomplish the “emotion perception” task—
producing a representation of action, as well as the mental states that produced those 
actions. Interestingly, activity in one network or the other tends to “win” out when 
contextual information informing mental state inference is at odds with the nonverbal 
behavior observed (Zaki et al., 2010). But recruitment of the mentalizing network appears 
to be fairly routine—it is even engaged when perceivers view non-affective social scenes 
with no instructions or need to engage in mentalizing (Wagner, Kelley, & Heatherton, 
2011). The extent to which the “mentalizing” network is engaged is related to trait level 
empathy, or the tendency to both apprehend and share in another’s affective state. Taken 
together, these findings converge with the action identification framework described 
above, where a behavioral understanding of action is primary and is not necessarily 
coupled with mental state inference, but often is. 
 While variation in the tendency to perceive mental states behind actions has been 
characterized within individual difference and situational frameworks, there has been 
relatively little discussion of the possibility that cultures may also vary in the extent to 
which they routinely engage in mental state inference. The cross-cultural research 
presented in the first two chapters of this dissertation suggests that there may be cultural 
differences in the tendency to perceive actions versus mental states in response to the 
emotional facial actions or vocalizations of others. Individuals from the Himba culture, 
from an isolated ethnic group in Northwest Namibia, tended to describe facial actions and 
vocalizations with behavioral descriptors, such as “crying”, rather than with mental state 
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descriptors, such as “sadness”. Further, data driven analysis of how Himba individuals 
perceived the similarity between facial actions supported the conclusion that they 
attended to behavioral dimensions, rather than the Western mental state categories we 
tested.  Participants from the United States, on the other hand, tended to infer mental 
states and made less purely behavioral attributions. These findings suggest the intriguing 
possibility that there is a relatively stable cultural difference in the tendency to infer 
mental versus behavioral content in non-verbal emotional cues.  
While a stable cross-cultural difference between Himba and US cultures is a 
possibility, it also may be the case that the observed differences in mental state inference 
between cultures were driven by the constraints of our experimental paradigm. For 
example, one possibility is that during the translation process, the translator emphasized 
focusing on behaviors, unbeknownst to the researchers.  This would leave open the 
possibility that the cross-cultural pattern observed was simply an issue with the 
interpretation and understanding of instructions, rather than a real cultural difference 
between Himba and US participants.  If it is the case that no stable cultural difference 
exists, and instead our effects were driven by a simple issue with instructions, we should 
be able to easily induce the “Himba” pattern of sorting in US participants simply by 
asking them to sort by behaviors (rather than emotions).  
The Present Study 
To address the possibility that cross-cultural differences observed in Chapter 2 
were driven by differences in instructions, as opposed to a more stable cultural difference 
in the tendency to infer mental states (perhaps based on variation in the concept of 
emotion), we decided to replicate our original experiment within a US culture context, 
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but to manipulate the manner in which we instruct participants.  We varied the extent to 
which our instructions emphasized mental versus behavioral content.  Specifically, 
participants were instructed to sort a set of faces portraying emotional actions based on:  
(1) behavior, (2) emotion, or (3) mental states. If the Himba participants sorted items in a 
distinct manner from US participants simply because the translation process led to an 
emphasis on behavior, participants in a US cultural context instructed to emphasize 
behavior should produce a similar sorting pattern to the Himba participants. If, on the 
other hand, a more stable cultural difference is at hand, asking US participants to sort 
portrayals of emotional facial actions more behaviorally versus mentally shouldn't 
dramatically shape sorting, because US participants should engage in mental state 
inference regardless of condition. This second pattern of findings would suggest that (a) 
simple instruction differences are unlikely to account for cross-cultural differences 
observed and (b) that the tendency to engage in mental state inference (to emotional cues) 
is relatively routine and inflexible in a US cultural sample exposed to emotional stimuli.  
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 76 Northeastern University undergraduate 
students (32 male, 44 female; mean age= 18.85, sd= 1.12). All participants were Native 
English speakers and over 18 years of age.  Participants were recruited via flyers around 
campus or from the Psychology Department participant pool. 
Stimuli.  Stimuli were 4x6 cards containing photographs of facial expressions of 
emotion posed by African American individuals.  Stimuli were the same as those used in 
Study 2.  
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Procedure. All participants were consented prior to the start of the experimental 
session.  As in Study 2, all participants in this experiment were asked to complete a 
sorting task as well as answer questions about their sort. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three possible “focus” conditions: behavioral (N=25; 11 male), 
emotion (N=25; 10 male), or mental (N=26; 11 male).  The stimuli were identical in all 
three conditions, but participants were instructed to sort them in a distinct manner 
depending on condition.   
Participants in the behavior condition were instructed:  “I am going to give you a 
pile of pictures. The people in this pile are all doing something.  Some of them are 
behaving in same way and some of the people are behaving differently.  What I want you 
to do now is to sort the faces in the pile based on how the people are behaving or what it 
is that they are doing.  You should create piles where each person is doing exactly the 
same thing. At the end, each pile you’ve made should have pictures of only people who 
are behaving in the same way.  Are these instructions clear?  You can create as many 
piles as you need to.  This is not timed, so feel free to take as long as you need.  You can 
also change the piles whenever you wish, while you are sorting or at the end. Do you 
have any questions?” 
Participants in the mental state condition were instructed: “I am going to give you 
a pile of pictures. The people in this pile all have an experience going on in their minds.  
Some of them have the same sort of mental experience, whereas others have a different 
type of experience in their minds.  What I want you to do now is to sort the faces in the 
pile based on what is happening inside the minds of the people in the pictures.  You 
should create piles where each person has exactly the same type of mental state. At the 
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end, each pile you’ve made should have pictures of only people who experiencing the 
same thing in their minds.  Are these instructions clear?  You can create as many piles as 
you need to.  This is not timed, so feel free to take as long as you need.  You can also 
change the piles whenever you wish, while you are sorting or at the end. Do you have any 
questions?” 
Participants in the emotion condition were instructed: “I am going to give you a 
pile of pictures. The people in this pile are all feeling something.  Some of them feel the 
same emotion and some of the people feel differently.  What I want you to do now is to 
sort the faces in the pile based on how the people feel.  You should create piles where 
each person feels exactly the same way. At the end, each pile you’ve made should have 
pictures of only people who feel the same emotion.  Are these instructions clear?  You 
can create as many piles as you need to.  This is not timed, so feel free to take as long as 
you need.  You can also change the piles whenever you wish, while you are sorting or at 
the end. Do you have any questions?” 
Participants were then allowed to sort the images into piles based on the 
instructions they were provided with. Once the participant sorted the images into distinct 
piles, the participant was then asked provide a word to describe the content of each pile.  
This was initially asked about each pile on the table in an open-ended manner (i.e., “What 
is in this pile?”).  The experimenter then filled in a record sheet with any facial 
descriptors or emotions/behaviors/mental states that the participant produced.  These 
responses were marked as “unprompted” because the experimenter did not question 
specifically about other content.  This line of questioning allows for assessment of how 
the piles are spontaneously anchored by the participant.  Next, the experimenter asked 
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about facial behaviors (i.e., “What is on the face of these people?” or “What is the facial 
expression?” or “What is this person doing with their face that tells you about their 
emotion?”). The second and third phrasing of this prompt was only given if participants 
did not provide a response to the initial prompting. Finally, the experimenter asked about 
behavior/mental state or emotion (i.e., “What (emotion/behavior/mental state) are these 
people (feeling/doing/experiencing)?”). Any relevant response at this prompt would be 
marked as “prompted”.   
Results 
Data Coding. Data were coded in the same manner as Study 2.   
Cluster Analysis.  We performed a cluster analysis on the data from each 
instruction group separately to examine whether the clustering of items by emotions 
varied based on the instruction condition that participants were placed in. Data were 
summarized within a group as a co-occurrence matrix and subsequently converted into a 
dissimilarity matrix. An agglomerative average-linkage hierarchical cluster analysis 
(Sokal & Michener, 1958) was then conducted. The results (Figure 1) of the six cluster 
solutions are very consistent across the three instruction conditions (behavior, emotion, 
and mental state). Participants clustered facial expressions into the 6 discrete emotion 
categories in a manner consistent with the Western cultural model for emotion, regardless 
of condition.  A six-cluster solution was reported on based on the increases in within 
cluster average item distance when the solution contained less than six clusters, (i.e., as 
items were grouped into larger, increasingly inclusive clusters, the clusters became less 
coherent; Figures 2-4), for theoretical reasons (since 6 discrete expression portrayals were 
included in the set), as well as to make the analyses maximally comparable to those 
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conducted in Study 2.  
Multidimensional Scaling. Consistent with the approach laid out in Study 2, in 
order to best represent the data without further imposing emotion categories onto 
participants sorting behavior as a means to quantify it, we employed multidimensional 
scaling (MDS).  MDS allowed us to examine the underlying dimensions that structure 
sorting depending on instruction condition.  This was accomplished by computing a co-
occurrence matrix (Coxon, 1982) for each of the 3 groups (behavior, emotion, and mental 
state focused) and subjecting those matrices to MDS in ALSCAL. MDS provides the 
structure of a set of objects from data that approximate the distances between pairs of the 
objects. The points are arranged in space, defined by N dimensions, so that the distances 
between pairs of points in that space have the strongest possible relation to the 
similarities among the pairs of objects. A 4 dimensional solution was selected as the best 
fit across groups based on the elbow on the stress-by-dimensionality plot (Figure 5), 
although the 2 dimensional solutions (visualized in Figure 6) had sufficiently low stress 
to adequately capture the sorting data well. The scaling solutions resulting from these 
analyses can be treated in several different ways.  In a first approach, we looked at the 
distances in multidimensional space between portrayals of the same emotion category 
(Figure 6). What we can see fairly clearly is very few systematic differences across 
groups, either based on visual inspection of the MDS solutions rendered in 2D space 
(Figure 6) or based on clustering of emotions in multidimensional space (Figure 7).   
Additionally, we performed a set of hierarchical multiple regressions on the 
scaling solutions in order to examine the underlying dimensions themselves.  Because 
interpretation of the dimensions yielded by multidimensional scaling can be difficult to 
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accomplish completely subjectively (particularly for higher dimensionality solutions), we 
examined the dimensions for each solution in a data driven manner.  As in Study 2, we 
used a set of normative ratings on each of the 36 images in the stimulus set.  The set of 36 
images were rated on a given attribute (14 total) by separate sets of 40 observers each on 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (for a total of 560 participants).  Attributes were behavioral 
descriptors: crying, frowning, laughing, looking, pouting, scowling, smelling, smiling and 
emotional descriptors: anger, fear, disgust, sadness, neutral, happiness. We then 
performed hierarchical multiple regressions on the dimension	  coordinates	  of	  each	  face 
stimulus (for each dimension).  By using hierarchical MDS, we were able to enter the 
different types of stimulus attribute variables (behaviors, discrete emotions) as blocks and 
examined the extent to which a given “model” is redundant (i.e., did not add much 
predictive power for accounting for stimulus coordinates on a given dimension).  We 
examined whether behavior and discrete emotions are redundant predictors of the 
solution dimensions or whether emotions predict unique variance over and above 
behavior. The results of the hierarchical multiple regressions are summarized in Table 1 
and F-tests are reported in Tables 2-4, for each of the groups, behavior, emotion and 
mental state, respectively.  Converging with the other analysis approaches, participants in 
the behavioral condition appeared to use discrete emotion categories over and above the 
behavior to structure the content of their sort.  Across all three conditions, the first two 
dimensions were best explained by a discrete emotion model (over and above a 
behavioral model).  Contrary to predictions, the emotion condition tended to engage 
discrete emotion sorting to a lesser extent than the behavioral and mental state conditions. 
That is, the third dimension of the solution for participants in the emotion condition was 
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explained by behavior, whereas it was explained by discrete emotion for participants in 
the other two conditions. 
Pile Label Analyses. We examined the words that participants freely offered to 
name their piles in order to examine whether participants differentially anchored their 
piles with behavioral versus mental state content, depending on the focus that their 
instructions emphasized.  We found both a main effect of instruction condition, F (1, 73) 
= 84.975, p <  .001, ηp2 = .700, label type, F (2, 146) = 82.912, p <  .001, ηp2 = .532, and 
an interaction between the two factors, F (4, 146) = 25.040, p <  .001, ηp2 = .407 (Figure 
8).  Follow-up single factor ANOVAs on each label type separately revealed that the 
production of behavioral labels did not differ by instruction group, F (2, 73) = 1.286, p =  
.282.  Both discrete emotion labels, F (2, 73) = 110.704, p <  .001, and other 
affective/emotion terms, F (2, 73) = 22.566, p <  .001, differed by instruction condition, 
however.  Follow-up bonferroni corrected comparisons revealed that participants in the 
behavioral instruction condition generated less discrete emotion labels and other 
affective/emotion terms compared to participants in the emotion and mental state 
instruction condition (all p’s < .001). Participants in the mental state and discrete emotion 
condition did not differ from one another in the number of labels produced for either 
content type (all p’s > .05).  These data indicate that individuals in the behavioral 
condition had difficulty using behaviors to structure their sort.  Yet the less frequent use 
of emotion terms in the behavioral instruction condition indicates that those participants 
were attempting to comply with instructions to sort by behavior (and as a byproduct 





 We found that attempts to manipulate participants’ emphasis on behaviors versus 
mental states had little impact on participants’ reliance on discrete emotion categories to 
make meaning of facial expressions. Specifically, across a number of analysis approaches 
we found evidence that US participants who were instructed to focus on the behaviors 
that faces were engaged in still tended to infer the mental states that caused those 
behaviors, and used those mental state categories to make sense of the similarities 
between facial expressions. This was reflected in the recovery of 6 Western discrete 
emotion categories in the cluster analyses.  Further, a data driven analysis of the 
underlying dimensions structuring participants’ cognitive maps (derived via 
multidimensional scaling) revealed that mental state (i.e., discrete emotion) ratings better 
characterized those dimensions than did simple behavioral ratings.  
The present findings help to rule out an “instruction” based explanation of the 
cross-cultural differences observed in Study 2 (Chapter 3). If Himba participants merely 
received instructions that over-emphasized behavioral aspects of the faces rather than 
mental state (i.e., to engage in action perception rather than focus on mental states) but do 
not actually differ from US participants in any stable, substantive way in their perception 
of emotion, we should have replicated the Himba pattern of data in our behavioral sorting 
condition.  Because this study failed to yield the “Himba pattern” of results when US 
participants were instructed to sort by behavior, these findings instead suggest that the 
patterns observed in Study 2 (Chapter 3) reflect a cultural difference between the US and 
Himba samples tested. 
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There may be several main drivers of the cultural differences observed between 
the Himba and US, beyond a simple instructional difference that this study helps to rule 
out.  One intriguing possibility is that the concept of emotion in Himba culture has less 
emphasis on mental/internal states, such that the differences between Himba and US 
perceivers were not due to a failure of the translation process, but due to a deeper cultural 
difference in the concept itself. Considerable cross-cultural differences in individual 
concepts for emotions have been noted (Russell, 1991; Wierzbicka, 1992). Further, 
differences appear to exist between cultures in the concept of emotion itself. For example, 
the English language definition of emotion has a heavy emphasis on mental state content.  
Webster’s defines emotion as “a conscious mental reaction (as anger or fear) subjectively 
experienced as strong feeling usually directed toward a specific object and typically 
accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body”.  While perhaps 
psychologists would not agree with this entire definition, the emphasis on the “internal” 
and “mental” is heavily emphasized in scientific definitions of emotion as well.  In 
contrast, the Japanese concept of emotion emphasizes dimensions of social relatedness 
and is thus constituted by an interaction between people that cannot be located within an 
individual (Mesquita, 2007). Although relatively little is known about the concept of 
emotion in Himba culture from a psychological (or even folk) standpoint, it is possible 
that the term implies relatively less mental (and perhaps individual) content than the 
individualistic concept of emotion in the United States. As a result, the cultural 
differences observed between our two samples may be due to differences in the meaning 
of the term emotion itself.   
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Further, the finding that Himba perceivers are less likely to engage in mental state 
attribution compared to US perceivers is counterintuitive given evidence that the more 
ambiguous, unfamiliar, or unpredictable a situation is, the more likely it is that 
individuals will engage in mental state inference (Waytz, et al. 2010). It is likely that the 
experimental task and stimuli met these situational criteria for Himba perceivers—yet the 
Himba data indicate that they were less likely than US participants to engage in mental 
state inference.  An interesting future direction would be to examine whether situational 
manipulations impact mental state inference in the same manner in Himba culture. One 
possibility is that, for the Himba, using behavioral categories actually satisfies the goals 
of mental state inference.  That is, within a Western cultural context, we infer mental 
states in order to understand current behavior, predict what will happen next, and tune our 
own behavior appropriately as the situation unfolds, all of which may be in the service of 
fostering a social connection with another individual (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007). 
But to the extent that emotion (and other mental state) categories are not special “kinds” 
of categories given by biology (Barrett, 2009), it may be that other types of categories in 
other cultures service similar goals to mental state categories in the United States.  
 The present findings also weigh in on the interesting question of whether mental 
state inference is as automatic in US culture as psychologists have assumed.  The present 
data align with the assumption that engaging in mental state inference does appear to be 
relatively relentless in US culture.  Despite instructions to engage in action perception, 
US perceivers in our sample still tended to infer mental states behind those actions.  That 
is, mental state inference was persistent in the sample of participants that we tested. 
These data are consistent with a host of neuroimaging data suggesting that the affective 
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or emotional aspects of faces are not completely “ignored” when the task is to engage in 
some other judgment like gender identification—indeed, these tasks are often referred to 
as “implicit” emotion perception tasks.   
 The present study is not without limitations.  While tendency to engage in mental 
state inference seems relatively inflexible in US culture, this may be due to a general 
disregard for instructions on the part of US participants compared to Himba participants. 
Our data cannot rule this potential explanation out entirely, but the pile labeling data we 
collected do suggest that the US participants were attending to the instructions.  That is, 
individuals in the behavioral sorting condition spontaneously produced less mental state 
labels (although they did not produce more behavioral labels), consistent with the 
interpretation that they understood they should be sorting by something other than mental 
states. In a sense, the labeling data appear to reflect a demand characteristic, which would 
not have resulted is the participants simply disregarded the instructions. A second 
limitation is that malleability in performance in the sort task based on the phrasing of 
instructions may itself be culturally relative. Thus we cannot rule out the possibility that 
manipulating instructions for participants in Himba culture might have yielded larger 
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  i	  Schyns and colleagues have recently published work (Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, 
& Schyns, 2012) indicating that facial expressions of emotion are culturally relative, 
suggesting that they may no longer support this claim.	  
	  	  
Table 1.  Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) Dimensions Identified using Hierarchical Multiple Regressions. 
  Dimension 1  Dimension 2  Dimension 3  Dimension 4 
Sort Solution  Behavior Discrete  Behavior Discrete  Behavior Discrete  Behavior Discrete 
Behavior  .869*** .091***  .906*** .060**  .824*** .093**  .745*** .101 
Emotion  .909*** .054**  .896*** .080***  .779*** .053  .708*** .055 
Mental State  .826*** .124***  .916*** .039**  .821*** .103***  .821*** .068 
Note. The first block of regressors was comprised of eight sets of ratings where the 36 face stimuli were rated for the extent to which 
they depicted specific behaviors (e.g., smelling, crying); R2 values are presented in the Behavior column under each dimension. The 
second block of regressors was comprised of six sets of ratings where each of the 36 faces was rated for the extent to which they 
represented discrete emotions (e.g., disgust, sadness); the R2 increase is presented under each dimension labeled Discrete.  The change 
in R2 reflects the additional variability accounted for by the discrete emotion predictors over and above behavioral predictors.  Thus 
dimensions for which the change in R2 is significant reflect discrete emotion information, rather than strictly behavioral information.  




Table 2. Dimension Identification: Behavioral Focus Sorting 
  Model 1 (Behavior) Model 2 (Behavior + Emotion) 
Dimension Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
1 Crying 0.211 0.245 0.115 -0.302 0.268 -0.165 
 Frowning 1.382 0.41 1.096** -0.098 0.403 -0.078 
 Laughing -0.691 0.809 -0.485 -0.615 0.561 -0.432 
 Looking 0.889 0.237 0.338*** -0.197 0.329 -0.075 
 Pouting -0.945 0.289 -0.686** -0.097 0.333 -0.07 
 Scowling -0.752 0.322 -0.58* -0.781 0.363 -0.602* 
 Smelling 1.402 0.26 0.585*** 0.134 0.373 0.056 
 Smiling 0.973 0.596 0.951 0.554 0.538 0.541 
 Anger    -0.169 0.307 -0.122 
 Sad    0.038 0.267 0.028 
 Disgust    0.892 0.376 0.689* 
 Fear    -0.14 0.226 -0.118 
 Neutral    -0.958 0.197 -0.836*** 
 Happiness    -0.022 0.714 -0.02 
 R2  .869   .960  
 F for change in R2  22.241***   7.969***  
        
2 Crying -0.319 0.201 -0.18 0.066 0.24 0.037 
 Frowning -0.66 0.336 -0.542 0.434 0.361 0.356 
 Laughing 0.604 0.663 0.439 -0.148 0.503 -0.107 
 Looking -0.526 0.194 -0.207* -0.15 0.295 -0.059 
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 Pouting 0.244 0.237 0.184 -0.223 0.299 -0.168 
 Scowling 0.338 0.263 0.27 0.127 0.326 0.102 
 Smelling -0.349 0.213 -0.151 -0.118 0.334 -0.051 
 Smiling 0.29 0.489 0.294 -0.804 0.482 -0.814 
 Anger    0.239 0.275 0.179 
 Sad    -0.071 0.239 -0.053 
 Disgust    -0.052 0.337 -0.042 
 Fear    0.089 0.203 0.077 
 Neutral    0.365 0.177 0.329 
 Happiness    2.339 0.639 2.194*** 
 R2  .906   .966  
 F for change in R2  32.349***   6.097**  
        
3 Crying -0.083 0.204 -0.063 -0.459 0.276 -0.35 
 Frowning -0.057 0.341 -0.063 -0.301 0.416 -0.334 
 Laughing -0.341 0.671 -0.334 0.347 0.579 0.34 
 Looking 0.969 0.197 0.515*** 0.528 0.339 0.281 
 Pouting -0.481 0.24 -0.488 -0.494 0.344 -0.501 
 Scowling -0.493 0.267 -0.531 -0.027 0.375 -0.03 
 Smelling -0.075 0.216 -0.044 0.432 0.385 0.252 
 Smiling -0.443 0.495 -0.605 0.832 0.555 1.136 
 Anger    0.449 0.317 0.454 
 Sad    0.313 0.275 0.317 
 Disgust    -0.514 0.388 -0.555 
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 Fear    0.743 0.233 0.869** 
 Neutral    0.457 0.203 0.557* 
 Happiness    -1.277 0.736 -1.616 
 R2  .771   .861  
 F for change in R2  15.749***   3.926**  
        
4 Crying -0.341 0.204 -0.311 0.172 0.314 0.157 
 Frowning -0.055 0.342 -0.073 0.41 0.472 0.543 
 Laughing -0.757 0.674 -0.887 -0.702 0.657 -0.823 
 Looking 0.371 0.197 0.236 0.5 0.385 0.318 
 Pouting -0.295 0.241 -0.358 -0.472 0.39 -0.574 
 Scowling 0.863 0.268 1.112** 0.836 0.425 1.078 
 Smelling -0.06 0.217 -0.042 0.24 0.437 0.168 
 Smiling 0.695 0.497 1.136 0.464 0.63 0.758 
 Anger    -0.375 0.36 -0.453 
 Sad    -0.676 0.312 -0.818* 
 Disgust    -0.564 0.44 -0.729 
 Fear    -0.297 0.265 -0.416 
 Neutral    -0.272 0.231 -0.396 
 Happiness    -0.513 0.835 -0.777 
 R2  .745   .847  
 F for change in R2  9.876***   2.317  Note.	  Hierarchical	  multiple	  regressions	  were	  conducted	  to	  identify	  the	  derived	  dimensions	  from	  the	  MDS	  analyses.	  	  Predictors 
were entered in blocks: Model 1 contained only behavior vectors as predictors; Model 2 contained both behavior and emotion vectors. 
Coefficients for each predictor within each model are presented as well as the relevant F-test for a significant change in prediction (R2) 
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between models. A separate regression was conducted for each dimension that resulted from the Multidimensional scaling of sorting 
data. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001 
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Table 3. Dimension Identification: Emotion Focus Sorting 
  Model 1 (Behavior) Model 2 (Behavior + Emotion) 
Dimension Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
1 Crying -0.118 0.203 -0.065 0.201 0.257 0.11 
 Frowning -0.888 0.34 -0.709* -0.098 0.386 -0.078 
 Laughing 0.302 0.669 0.213 0.598 0.538 0.422 
 Looking -0.776 0.196 -0.297*** 0.14 0.315 0.054 
 Pouting 0.549 0.239 0.402* 0.079 0.319 0.058 
 Scowling 0.371 0.266 0.288 0.498 0.348 0.386 
 Smelling -1.053 0.215 -0.442*** -0.106 0.357 -0.045 
 Smiling -0.992 0.493 -0.976 -0.053 0.516 -0.052 
 Anger    0.108 0.294 0.079 
 Sad    0.029 0.256 0.021 
 Disgust    -0.581 0.36 -0.452 
 Fear    0.189 0.217 0.159 
 Neutral    0.895 0.189 0.786*** 
 Happiness    -0.889 0.684 -0.81 
 R2  .909   .963  
 F for change in R2  33.711***   5.045**  
        
2 Crying 0.293 0.208 0.167 -0.332 0.196 -0.19 
 Frowning 0.994 0.349 0.825** -0.275 0.295 -0.228 
 Laughing -0.374 0.688 -0.275 0.11 0.411 0.081 
 Looking 0.986 0.201 0.393*** -0.138 0.241 -0.055 
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 Pouting -0.304 0.245 -0.231 0.345 0.244 0.262 
 Scowling -0.457 0.273 -0.369 -0.337 0.266 -0.272 
 Smelling 0.517 0.221 0.226* -0.133 0.273 -0.058 
 Smiling -0.193 0.507 -0.198 0.262 0.395 0.268 
 Anger    0.225 0.225 0.17 
 Sad    0.2 0.196 0.151 
 Disgust    0.377 0.275 0.305 
 Fear    0.301 0.166 0.264 
 Neutral    -0.49 0.144 -0.448** 
 Happiness    -0.853 0.523 -0.809 
 R2  .896   .961  
 F for change in R2  29.139***   11.916***  
        
3 Crying -0.401 0.237 -0.293 -0.156 0.409 -0.114 
 Frowning 0.361 0.397 0.384 -0.298 0.615 -0.317 
 Laughing -0.789 0.783 -0.742 -0.485 0.856 -0.456 
 Looking 0.995 0.229 0.507*** 0.808 0.501 0.412 
 Pouting -0.107 0.279 -0.104 0.509 0.508 0.495 
 Scowling -1.189 0.311 -1.23** -0.673 0.554 -0.696 
 Smelling 0.039 0.252 0.022 -0.692 0.569 -0.387 
 Smiling -0.092 0.577 -0.12 -0.072 0.821 -0.095 
 Anger    -0.278 0.469 -0.27 
 Sad    -0.382 0.407 -0.372 
 Disgust    0.609 0.573 0.631 
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 Fear    0.415 0.345 0.466 
 Neutral    0.187 0.301 0.219 
 Happiness    0.162 1.088 0.197 
 R2  .779   .833  
 F for change in R2  11.907***   1.116  
        
4 Crying -0.374 0.215 -0.347 -0.041 0.384 -0.038 
 Frowning -0.103 0.36 -0.138 0.315 0.577 0.424 
 Laughing 0.002 0.71 0.003 0.042 0.804 0.05 
 Looking 0.428 0.208 0.277* 0.374 0.471 0.242 
 Pouting -0.246 0.253 -0.304 -0.404 0.477 -0.499 
 Scowling 0.852 0.282 1.117** 0.81 0.521 1.062 
 Smelling -0.358 0.228 -0.254 -0.072 0.534 -0.051 
 Smiling 0.098 0.524 0.163 -0.073 0.771 -0.121 
 Anger    -0.068 0.44 -0.084 
 Sad    -0.457 0.382 -0.562 
 Disgust    -0.468 0.538 -0.614 
 Fear    -0.042 0.324 -0.06 
 Neutral    -0.11 0.282 -0.163 
 Happiness    -0.143 1.022 -0.22 
 R2  .708   .763  
 F for change in R2  8.182***   .810  Note.	  Hierarchical	  multiple	  regressions	  were	  conducted	  to	  identify	  the	  derived	  dimensions	  from	  the	  MDS	  analyses.	  	  Predictors 
were entered in blocks: Model 1 contained only behavior vectors as predictors; Model 2 contained both behavior and emotion vectors. 
Coefficients for each predictor within each model are presented as well as the relevant F-test for a significant change in prediction (R2) 
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between models. A separate regression was conducted for each dimension that resulted from the Multidimensional scaling of sorting 
data. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001 
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Table S3. Dimension Identification: Mental State Focus Sorting 
  Model 1 (Behavior) Model 2 (Behavior + Emotion) 
Dimension Variable B SE B β B SE B β 
1 Crying 0.424 0.275 0.238 -0.354 0.292 -0.199 
 Frowning 1.125 0.46 0.918* -0.185 0.439 -0.151 
 Laughing -0.363 0.906 -0.262 -0.591 0.611 -0.426 
 Looking 0.765 0.265 0.299** -0.445 0.358 -0.174 
 Pouting -0.723 0.323 -0.54* -0.161 0.363 -0.12 
 Scowling -0.36 0.36 -0.286 -0.492 0.396 -0.39 
 Smelling 1.088 0.291 0.467** 0 0.406 0 
 Smiling 0.916 0.668 0.92 0.205 0.586 0.206 
 Anger    -0.168 0.334 -0.125 
 Sad    0.333 0.29 0.248 
 Disgust    0.638 0.409 0.507 
 Fear    -0.385 0.246 -0.331 
 Neutral    -1.294 0.215 -1.16*** 
 Happiness    0.246 0.777 0.229 
 R2  .826   .950  
 F for change in R2  16.018***   8.644***  
        
2 Crying -0.042 0.182 -0.025 0.638 0.264 0.376* 
 Frowning -1.099 0.305 -0.94*** -0.531 0.398 -0.454 
 Laughing 0.172 0.601 0.13 0.107 0.554 0.081 
 Looking -0.339 0.176 -0.139 0.612 0.324 0.251 
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 Pouting 0.15 0.214 0.117 -0.016 0.329 -0.012 
 Scowling 0.641 0.239 0.533* 0.716 0.359 0.596 
 Smelling -0.101 0.193 -0.045 0.094 0.368 0.042 
 Smiling 0.467 0.443 0.492 0.359 0.531 0.378 
 Anger    -0.508 0.303 -0.396 
 Sad    -0.475 0.263 -0.371 
 Disgust    -0.062 0.371 -0.051 
 Fear    -0.287 0.223 -0.259 
 Neutral    0.339 0.194 0.319 
 Happiness    -0.079 0.704 -0.078 
 R2  .916   .955  
 F for change in R2  36.765***   2.995*  
        
3 Crying -0.11 0.229 -0.075 0.254 0.295 0.173 
 Frowning 0.04 0.383 0.04 -0.983 0.443 -0.974* 
 Laughing -0.449 0.755 -0.393 0.434 0.617 0.38 
 Looking 1.241 0.221 0.59*** 0.874 0.362 0.416* 
 Pouting -0.527 0.27 -0.478 0.458 0.367 0.416 
 Scowling -0.773 0.3 -0.745* -0.254 0.4 -0.245 
 Smelling 0.578 0.243 0.301* -0.237 0.41 -0.124 
 Smiling -0.453 0.557 -0.553 0.245 0.592 0.299 
 Anger    -0.068 0.338 -0.061 
 Sad    -0.677 0.293 -0.613* 
 Disgust    0.716 0.413 0.691 
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 Fear    0.754 0.249 0.788** 
 Neutral    0.442 0.217 0.482 
 Happiness    -0.807 0.785 -0.914 
 R2  .821   .924  
 F for change in R2  15.520***   4.762**  
        
4 Crying -0.051 0.171 -0.047 0.422 0.266 0.386 
 Frowning -0.555 0.286 -0.738 -0.261 0.4 -0.348 
 Laughing 0.042 0.563 0.05 0.036 0.557 0.043 
 Looking 0.312 0.165 0.199 0.255 0.326 0.163 
 Pouting -0.203 0.201 -0.247 -0.124 0.331 -0.152 
 Scowling 1.242 0.224 1.607*** 0.928 0.361 1.201* 
 Smelling -0.02 0.181 -0.014 -0.07 0.37 -0.049 
 Smiling 0.078 0.415 0.128 -0.347 0.534 -0.569 
 Anger    0.019 0.305 0.024 
 Sad    -0.645 0.265 -0.784* 
 Disgust    -0.063 0.373 -0.082 
 Fear    -0.087 0.225 -0.122 
 Neutral    -0.12 0.196 -0.175 
 Happiness    0.213 0.709 0.324 
 R2  .821   .889  
 F for change in R2  15.475***   2.139  Note.	  Hierarchical	  multiple	  regressions	  were	  conducted	  to	  identify	  the	  derived	  dimensions	  from	  the	  MDS	  analyses.	  	  Predictors 
were entered in blocks: Model 1 contained only behavior vectors as predictors; Model 2 contained both behavior and emotion vectors. 
Coefficients for each predictor within each model are presented as well as the relevant F-test for a significant change in prediction (R2) 
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between models. A separate regression was conducted for each dimension that resulted from the Multidimensional scaling of sorting 




Fig 1. The results of the six-cluster solutions from the hierarchical cluster analyses are 
plotted in A-C with cluster on the x-axis. The y-axis represents the number of items 
grouped into a given cluster, with contents stacked by the emotion portrayed in each 
posed facial expression. Stacked bars containing several different colors indicate that 
faces portraying different discrete emotions were clustered together. Bars with a single 
color (or predominance of a given color) indicate relatively clean clustering of faces 
depicting one emotion category. The behavioral sort (A) cluster solution contains very 






Figure 2. Cluster analysis dendrogram for participants in the behavioral focus condition. 
As an increasing number of items are included in a cluster, the more inclusive cluster also 
increases the average distance within the cluster.  As each cluster (which starts out as a 
single item) is united with another cluster (i.e., agglomerated), this is indicated in the 
dendrogram by a bracket.  The longer the bracket between two clusters (i.e., the bigger 
the distance before two clusters are joined), the more spread out the newly formed cluster 







Figure 3. Cluster analysis dendrogram for participants in the emotion focus condition. As 
an increasing number of items are included in a cluster, the more inclusive cluster also 
increases the average distance within the cluster.  As each cluster (which starts out as a 
single item) is united with another cluster (i.e., agglomerated), this is indicated in the 
dendrogram by a bracket.  The longer the bracket between two clusters (i.e., the bigger 
the distance before two clusters are joined), the more spread out the newly formed cluster 




Figure 4. Cluster analysis dendrogram for participants in the mental state focus 
condition. As an increasing number of items are included in a cluster, the more inclusive 
cluster also increases the average distance within the cluster.  As each cluster (which 
starts out as a single item) is united with another cluster (i.e., agglomerated), this is 
indicated in the dendrogram by a bracket.  The longer the bracket between two clusters 
(i.e., the bigger the distance before two clusters are joined), the more spread out the 








Fig. 5. Stress-by-dimensionality (left) and RSQ-by-dimensionality (right) plots for 
multidimensional scaling solutions of 1-6 dimensionality for three separate instruction 
groups: behavior, mental state, and emotion.  The number of dimensions in a given 
solution is plotted on the x-axis. A sharp elbow can be observed in all three conditions on 
the stress-by-dimensionality plot at 4 dimensions, indicating that additional dimensions 




Fig. 6. MDS derived configurations plotted in two-dimensional space for US participants 
instructed to sort based on behaviors (A) mental states (B) or emotions (C). Items are 
plotted by discrete emotion portrayal type.  Faces that were typically sorted together are 
closer together in space.  Clustering by discrete emotion is clearly evident and few 
differences emerge across group solutions.  One notable shift, however, is the shift in 







Fig. 7.  Mean distance between faces portraying a given emotion across multidimensional 
space.  We quantified the clustering of items within a category across all dimensions and 










































Fig. 8. Pile labels used by instruction condition: Behavior, Emotion or Mental State. 
Mean number of words produced by each group (± standard error) is plotted on the y-axis 
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